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The purpose of this study is to describe and
evaluate the performance- of George E. Akerson as press
secretary to Herbert C. Hoover from January 1929 to
January 1931.
Akerson' s relations with the press and the
President will be the main emphasis of this study. The
press secretary's attitudes, methods, and impact will be of
particular interest along with his effort to establish
productive, regular presidential press conferences. This
is one in a series of Presidential Press Secretary studies
written at the University of Wisconsin School of
Journalism.
Significance
Herbert Hoover created the full-time official
position of Presidential Press Secretary and appointed
George Akerson as the first incumbent to this newly created
job. Since the Hoover appointment, Presidents have
maintained the position of Presidential Press Secretary as
a primary aide. While each President and press secretary
modified the job to fit his own requirements, the basic






years. Richard M. Nixon, however, modified this develop-
ment when he appointed his press spokesman, Ron Ziegler.
Ziegler will not carry the title of Presidential Press
Secretary nor will he function in a primary capacity on
press matters. In spite of this new development, the press
secretary position during the past forty years has evolved
into an identified, well-known, and at times powerful
assistantship.
Describing and evaluating the work of George
Akerson will establish the official institutionalization of
this job. The results of this study should provide some
insight into the development of presidential press
relations and the failures and successes of the public
relations efforts of the Hoover administration.
This is the first full-length study of George
Akerson. Little information on Akerson was published in
the newspapers and magazines of his day. Hoover
biographers include only a brief identification of the
press secretary. This study will be based mostly on the
information available in the Akerson Papers and the
Presidential Press Files in the Hoover Presidential
Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Main Sources of Information
Three information sources were used to develop this
thesis. First, the collection of Akerson Papers was
studied. This twenty-eight-box collection includes
'.




3correspondence dating back to Akerson* s employment on the
Minneapolis Tribune (1912-1925), his official files as
secretary to Mr. Hoover during the Commerce period, the
White House correspondence, and letters between Akerson and
Hoover after Akerson 's White House years. This collection
includes all the surviving records of the press secretary.
Akerson's son, George Akerson, Jr., has explained that
approximately two-thirds of his father's papers were lost
in the flood waters of a New England hurricane. The most
conspicuous material missing from these papers is some
record of Akerson's twice daily press briefings held with
the Washington correspondents.
The second information source was the Presidential
Press Files at West Branch. These files included the
complete verbatim record of the presidential press
conferences, the written questions from the White House
correspondents, the rough drafts of quotable presidential
announcements prepared by Akerson, and the final draft
copies of these quotations distributed to the press from
Akerson's office.
Books, magazines, and newspapers provided helpful
secondary source material. The concept of presidential
press relations explained in Elmer E. Cornwell's
Presidential Leadership Q± MMhlisi Opinion and James E.
Pollard's The. President aja& ±he_ Press was of particular
interest. Carl N. Degler's article, "The Ordeal of Herbert
].
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4Hoover," published in the Xalfi. Review , was helpful in
understanding Hoover's philosophy of the presidency. The
impact of Hoover on the press came primarily from these
three sources
:
1. Clair Nelson's "Herbert Hoover's Image in the
Press, " an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation from
Stanford University, 1956.
2. Alice Cohn Bernstein's "Press Opinion of Herbert
Hoover," unpublished Master's thesis from the
University of Wisconsin, 1941.
3. Surveys of press opinion sampled by the research
staff of French Strother, the President's Research
Secretary, collected in the Strother Papers at the
Presidential Library in West Branch.
The following unpublished Master's Degree theses from the
University of Wisconsin provided a helpful appreciation for
the development of the press secretary position since the
appointment of George Akerson:
1. Charles O'Donnell, Jr., "Stephen Tyree Early:
F.D.R. 's Press Secretary," 1967.
2. Gordon Ames Moon, II, "James Campbell Hagerty's
Eight Years in the White House," 1962.
3. Rolf William Utegaard, "Pierre Salinger's
•Thousand Days,'" 1967.
Organization of the study
Defining the job of Presidential Press Secretary is
the first step in this study. This job description in the
first chapter includes the responsibilities and authority
of the position, the working conditions and the
qualifications of the incumbent. Particular attention is


















5the President and their relationships with the press and
the public.
The background and career of George Akerson are
discussed in the second chapter with a detailed description
of the work he did during the Commerce period.
Describing and evaluating the work of a
presidential aide necessitates some consideration of the
President he serves and the events of the administration.
The third chapter describes the implications of Hoover's
public relations and the events of the Great Depression
with a brief review of the President's attitude toward
publicity and politics and the impact this attitude had on
Hoover's ability to lead the country.
Chapter IV describes and evaluates George Akerson'
s
performance as press secretary? his working conditions/ his
and Hoover's relations with the press, and the role
Akerson played in organizing and activating the press
conferences.
Some effort has been made to keep the emphasis of
this study on Akerson. Except for Chapter III, the
descriptions of Hoover's activities have been limited to













THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY
In the twentieth century, Presidents of the United
States have been a powerful influence on domestic and
foreign events. This power to influence has not been given
to the President by law, by Congress, or by his political
party, but, rather, it comes from the public he serves.
The President's job is leadership. He is good at his job
if he can mobilize public support for his administration.
The relationship between presidential power and
public support is explained by political scientists
Richard E. Neustadt and Elmer E. Cornwell. Neustadt states
that "Presidential power is the power to persuade."
Cornwell further explains this basic relationship!
The leverage the President has acquired in the law
making process has been indirect, based on the use of
the arts of persuasion, and ultimately grounded in the
popular support he can claim to mobilize. Hence his
link with the people is his key relationship.
2
But in an urban, industrialized, complex, mass
society, opportunities for direct dialogue between the
President and the people are severely limited. The
President's power to lead is a function of his ability to
communicate with the people. The President must talk to
the people through the mass media system of communications.
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8His ability to communicate with the people depends on his
ability to use this complicated, technical system. It is
the President's press secretary who provides the expertise
necessary for the operation of this system. The President's
need for power is met in some measure to the extent the
press secretary can activate the mass media to the
President's behalf.
The press secretary is appointed by the President.
The job does not exist unless the President wills it so.
The terms of the employment contract are clear* the press
secretary is appointed by the President and may be fired by
him at will without the advice, consent, or even the
notification of anyone. The press secretary owes his
loyalty to the President.
But to render this loyalty effectively, the press
secretary must understand and appreciate the needs and the
purposes of both the print and electronic media. The press
secretary is the intermediary between two major power
centers, the President and the press. He interprets each
to the other. It is through the office of the press
secretary that the statements, policies, thoughts, and
details of the President's official and private life are
collected and disseminated to the press. It is the press
secretary's judgment that largely determines the content
and timing of the news flow. This same office serves as a
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9attitudes, opinions/ and details about the press which in
turn are interpreted for the President. This is not to say
that there is not any direct dialogue between the President
and the press; there is. But the great bulk of information
which passes between the President and the press is
filtered in some way through the press secretary. It is in
this White House staff office that the point of contact is
made between the chief executive and the news media. It is
this point of contact, the press secretary, that is the
main concern of this thesis. The requirements and the
forces that come to bear on the press secretary/ his
ability to meet these forces, and the impact of his actions
are all central to this study.
Job Description
A new press secretary comes to the White House with
little precedent to guide him. The files of previous press
secretaries are not available to him; all such files are
considered private to the previous administration. What
was standard operating procedure for one President does not
carry over to his successor. Not law, nor custom/ nor
precedent/ nor written agreement determines the press
secretary's job. Whatever guidance he may have comes from
a mutual understanding between the President and the press
secretary. The power/ authority/ and responsibility of the
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10
perhaps even unspoken understanding between the press
secretary and his chief. This accounts in part for the
great difficulty encountered in documenting the story of
the press secretary. The business transacted between the
two men is either handled orally or at roost jotted down in
a brief note with little chance of survival in the record
3
of history.
But this does not mean the job is lacking in
specific shape and character; it has both. Although it has
officially existed for less than fifty years* some common
and basic premises have developed which describe the press
secretary's functions. What follows here is a job
description* not written from any direct authoritative
source but rather one based on the milieu of people and
pressures that define the press secretary's job. This
milieu describes the common threads of this evolving job
rather than any characteristic peculiar to a particular
press secretary or administration. In brief* the common
aspects of the press secretary's job are these:
1. He keeps the public informed as the President's
spokesman.
2. He prepares policy recommendations in the field of
information.
3. He facilitates the work of the President and the
press, with the President having his ultimate
priority.
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11
The press is a protagonist in this job description.
An active, healthy, vigorous press will seek out all
possible information about government activities. This
quest is basic to the "watch dog" function the press
assumes over government. But revealing information may not
always serve the purposes of government officials. What
and when information should be made public is the issue
basic to the struggle between the press and government.
"The struggle, " comments Douglass Cater, "of the govern-
ment's need for secrecy versus the public's right to Know
and the press's duty to find out and tell is unending.""1
Hopefully, the effective press secretary can
minimize this struggle and conflict by merging the need of
the press to listen and the need of the President to talk.
These overlapping objectives deserve some attention.
Since the relation between the press and the
President is not one of command and obedience, a good
amount of tact, persuasion, and skill is needed to exploit
those areas where their objectives are the same and avoid
those areas of conflict. Bill Moyers, a past press
secretary to President Johnson, defines the struggle
between the President and the press as one rising out of
conflicting objectives. The press wants immediate and
timely comment but the President "resists commenting on a
situation until he can be certain his words will produce













presidential promises, but "events make lies out of the
best promises." The press expects the President to reach
indisputable conclusions, but "the President must sometimes
5
reach conclusions from inconclusive evidence." It is
mostly left to the press secretary to negotiate a working
detente.
The press is not only a protagonist in this
communications process but is also a malcontent, one who is
never satisfied. The nature of the press appetite for the
news is such that it is always on the hungry side. This
unsatisfied hunger accounts for some measure of discontent.
And this discontent becomes part of the press secretary's
job.
No part of the President's life is considered
sacred to the press. This prerogative was established
early in American history. A Philadelphia newspaper once
charged that John Quincy Adams wore neither waist coat nor
cravat and even went barefoot to church. Pollard quotes
Adams 1 version of the story as he wrote in his diaryi
It is true only as regards the cravat instead of
which, in the extremity of the summer heat, I wear
around my neck a black silk riband. But, even in the
falsehoods of this charge, what I may profitably
remember is the perpetual and malignant watchfulness
with which I am observed in my open day and my secret
night, with the deliberate purpose of exposing me to
public obloquy or public ridicule.
6
To the present time, Presidents in some degree have






















Coolidge who first recognized the futility of it all and
probably more than any of his predecessors was willing to
7
expose the details of his private life to public gaze. It
would seem that Coolidge recognized the persistence of a
growing mass media. After Coolidge, Presidents would be
required to accomplish their purposes in the full glare of
publicity. The President could use this glare to his
advantage but he could no longer ignore it. It was left to
Coolidge 1 s successor, Herbert Hoover, to fully demonstrate
the dangers of ignoring the publicity glare around the
President
o
In addition to the President and the press, the
public also defines the press secretary's job. Ultimately
the allegiance of the President, the press secretary, and
the press must come to rest with the public. The public is
the voter to the President and the consumer to the press.
The mandate in a democratic, free-enterprise society is
that the interest of the voter and the consumer must be
served. In this case, the mandate rests with the "public's
right to know. Since the public does not have a specific
advocate to protect this right, advocacy is often split and
sometimes quarreled over by the President and the press.
Serving the public interest assumes that the server can
define both the public and its interest. This definition
is no simple task. Conflict arises when the President and









Since the press secretary's job is so closely
associated with the President's need to communicate with
the people, it is not surprising that the President wants a
man in his outer office whose full-time attention will be
given to facilitating the work of the press, a man in whom
he can place his trust, who knows the dangers of bad
publicity as well as the advantages of good publicity, and
aiost of all, a professional who can watch and interpret the
gprocess of public opinion formulation.
Job CQiyUtiona
A full description of the office of Presidential
Press Secretary is not only a list of what the man does,
but also a description of the conditions in which the man
must work. The working conditions of the press secretary
are pressure, conflict, complexity, and frustration.
Pressure is probably the most prevalent attendant
in the daily duties of the press secretary. Presidential
decisions are rarely made at anyone's leisure or conveni-
ence. The press secretary shares the President's schedule.
The press, too, contributes to this pressure with its
deadline organization. Considering the international
quality of most presidential news items, the press secre-
tary is always confronted with someone's deadline twenty-








kind of pressure on the press secretary. Although he is
not an elected official, the press secretary must live and
work in the "fish bowl" atmosphere of an elected
politician. He does not represent a constituency directly,
yet he is ultimately answerable to the public.
The atmosphere of the press secretary's office
contains a good measure of conflict. If the President is
involved in a conflict, the press secretary is usually
found in the front lines of the fray. When issues reach
the level of presidential consideration, it is because
they involve great conflicting factions. And each faction
will plead its cause in the press of the day. Conflict
between the President and the press is an inevitability
that is particularly hard on the press secretary. The
press and the President usually enjoy a short honeymoon
after inauguration and then a contest of vying for
advantage develops. The press secretary must often serve
as a counselor during these vying sessions. Conflict
between the President and the press reaches so deeply into
the press secretary's job that he must negotiate the
conflict with great skill or risk losing the confidence of
one or both of the participants. One complaint about
Charles G. Ross, Secretary to President Truman, was his
inability to negotiate conflict between the President and
the press. His loss of press confidence is commented upon
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Ross has been a distinct disappointment . • • Ross
was too fond of Truman to be an imaginative and helpful
assistant. 10
On the other hand, a successful press secretary is able to
maintain this delicate working relationship even within
conflicts
Steve Early seems to have held the balance with
remarkable skill between serving his boss's best
interest and defending before him the rights of the
press- 11
The complexities of daily life in the White House
also make demands on the attention of the press secretary.
There are no easy problems or answers to the issues that
gain presidential attention. The press secretary, to
varying degrees, must be knowledgeable about the issues
facing the President and the complexities of government for
two reasons. One, as in the case of Jim Hagerty, the
President requires it. Pierre Salinger makes this point in
his book, With Kennedy , in his discussion of the difference
between his role and that of Hagerty* s to provide comment
on the issues of the days
In addition to running the press shop, he ^agert^/
was one of President Eisenhower's advisers on foreign
and domestic policy. My own policy duties were in the
information field. While Jim had a voice in deciding
what the administration would do, I was responsible
only for presenting that decision to the public in a
way that would generate the best possible reception. 12
The second reason lies in the press secretary's ready
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17
on nearly any issue facing the administration. Douglass
Cater describes this aspect of the job*
He is the hourly spokesman of the President, the
constant stand-in for the public image of the
President. Two and three times daily he meets with the
regulars and any other reporters who may wander in.
These sessions may drone along on humdrum matters or
just as suddenly erupt in high drama. 13
The requirements of the press also bring
complexities to the press secretary job. The expertise
needed to understand the ever diversifying and growing mass
media strains even a professional's abilities. The growth
of the mass media in the twentieth century has not only
been a growth in size but also has been a growth in
capabilities. Innovations in the print media as well as
the development of the electronics media make available to
the President a greater potential for communication. But
before this potential can be realized, many complex
problems need to be solved. Just bringing some semblance
of equity to the variety of media agents who seek
presidential news requires specific knowledge of each
agent's needs. Helping the President get the best use from
the communications facilities available to him necessitates
that the press secretary keep his professional knowledge up
to date.
Any job that exists in an atmosphere of pressure,
conflict, and complexity must surely generate a great deal
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brings many restrictions. The press secretary's will must
often be tempered by the limits placed on him by the
President, the press, and the public.
But along with frustration, the job also generates
great prestige. The Presidential Press Secretary occupies
a top position in the hierarchy of government public
relations and information posts. George Akerson, Herbert
Hoover's press secretary, was not unaware of the prestige
and advantage given to those close to the chief executive.
He described the advantage this way during a speech given
at the Paramount Convention in April 1931
i
It is obvious that the office of the Secretary to
the President in the White House provides a great
vantage point for the study of American life. It is
like being on a mountain top from which one can survey
all the various interests of this and other nations of
the world. Sooner or later in the course of an
administration, the representative heads of all large
industries come to the White House to see the
President. 14
A job so close to the President and the press draws
the pressures, conflicts, complexities, and frustrations
inherent in each.
Job Qualifications
Just as there are no written, standardized criteria
to determine the qualities of the press secretary's job,
so, too, there are no written qualifications for the job's
incumbent. What background and experience best qualifies















It is assumed that the incumbent needs media
experience. Since the position was officially established
by Herbert Hoover, every incumbent has in some way
participated in the news process. There have been wire
service men, news bureau chiefs, newspaper reporters, and a
journalism professor; the experience of each varies, but
all have had to face the questions and problems of press
relations before they came to serve their respective
Presidents.
That the press secretary be experienced in some
phase of government work or in politics is not so easily
assumed or demonstrated, but there is some suggestion that
this experience would contribute to his effectiveness.
James Hagerty, who not only had newspaper qualifications
but also had government experience as Executive Assistant
to Governor Dewey, makes this comment about that service:
It took about a year to become "reasonably
confident." Going into government work is quite an
education in itself. Despite what you think you know
from the outside about government, you really have to
go to school, learn the fundamentals, and study
government all the time. 15
The variations and combinations of personality
traits needed by the incumbent press secretary will always
be subject to some discussion. There have been colorful,
extroverted secretaries as well as reserved, quiet men.
Some personality descriptions of men who have served
















gathered here to show the diverse personalities who have
served in this job.
On Fred Carpenter/ President Taft's secretary:
He was a shy, reserved, quiet chap, who had been
private secretary to Mr. Taft in the War Department. 16
On William Loeb, President Theodore Roosevelt's
secretary*
To the press, Loeb was a sympathetic collaborator
and gentle pacificator of ruffled feelings. The kindly
secretary issued statements ... although when
necessary, he could be as bland and discrete as a
polished diplomat. 17
On Joseph Tumulty, President Wilson's secretary*
What a rather austere and dignified president
lacked in human warmth and gregariousness was more than
made up for by the personal qualities of this genial
Irishman. 18
On George Akerson, President Hoover's secretary:
Mr. Hoover seems to derive great comfort and
perhaps some amusement from Akerson 's hearty self-
assurance, his back-slapping expansiveness, his boyish
bluster. 19
On Steve Early, President Franklin Roosevelt's
secretary:
A quick and (while it lasted) almost ungovernable
temper. 20
There is little to convince any observer that any
one personality combination best answers the requirements
of the job. Having said this, the one crucial exception
will now be considered.
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21
secretary must have the personality traits that engender
credibility and confidence to the press, the President, and
the public. This combination is the very whole cloth out
of which the job is cut. Without it, there is no job.
The secretary must have ready access to the
presidential office as the need requires. A "walk-in M
privilege is necessary if the press secretary is to respond
quickly and accurately to press queries. The press must
know that the press secretary speaks with the full knowl-
edge and backing of his boss.
Confidence and credibility are no less required
between the press secretary and the press. The press must
not only believe in the authority of the press secretary,
but must also believe in his honesty as a professional
newsman. The combined pressures of an inquisitive press on
one side and a reluctant President on the other side may
often tempt the press secretary to engage in "little white M
deceptions. But to do so usually proves disastrous for
both the press secretary and the President.
Certainly a White House staff member who stands so
close to the President and is so visible to the public must
also command the confidence of the public. Anything less
than public confidence renders the press secretary








Men are attracted or not attracted to this kind of
job for a variety of reasons. Like most government jobs,
the pay is not nearly commensurate with the responsibil-
ities. But the challenge, the fame, and the proximity to
power is a tempting inducement. When Franklin Roosevelt
asked Steve Early to join his secretariat and reorganize
the White House and governmental press relations, Early was
quoted as saying, "It was like a bugle call. I couldn't
21
afford it, but it never occurred to me to refuse."
Perhaps every man who has accepted the presidential
invitation to the office of the Presidential Press
Secretary hears a bugle call in the form of a challenge to
pit his particular qualifications against the pressures,
conflicts, complexities, and frustrations of this job. He
is tempted to test his ability to routinize and control
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George Akerson rarely appeared to be the man he
really was; mistakes and misrepresentations blur the
picture we have today of this man. He was Norwegian on
both sides of his family, yet the press referred to him as
"The Big Swede, M He was rarely without a bad debt letter
pending, yet he wore custom tailored suits, belonged to the
most exclusive clubs, and even when finances restricted his
choice of car to a Chevrolet, he employed a chauffeur. He
was employed as a newsman and later as a press secretary,
yet most of his activities were political in nature. He
was always in close proximity to the Secretary of Commerce
and the President, yet he rarely participated in major
decisions.
Biography
George Akerson was born September 5, 1889, into a
farm family near Minneapolis, Minnesota. He worked on his
uncle* s farm near Minneapolis until he was ready for
college. To prepare himself for the entrance requirements
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He graduated from Harvard in 1912 with a B.A.
degree. During these years at Allegheny College and
Harvard, Akerson supported himself by playing the piano and
organ for any group that would pay a struggling student.
While at Harvard/ Akerson married a Wellesley co-ed,
Harriet Blake of Omaha, Nebraska. There were three
children by this marriage, all sons.
Akerson worked for the Minneapolis Tribune from
1912 to 1921 as a city and state political reporter. He
was named the paper* s Washington correspondent in 1921. In
1923, he returned to Minneapolis to serve as assistant
managing editor for the Tribune . In 1925, Secretary of
State Prank B. Kellogg, named Akerson Secretary to the
National Sesquicentennial Exhibition Commission. This
appointment was a political acknowledgement of the work
Akerson had done on Kellogg *s behalf in Minnesota. The
Exhibition was held in Philadelphia to celebrate the 150th
anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of
Independence. Kellogg, as Secretary of State, and Hoover,
as Secretary of Commerce, represented the United States as
the host country. This appointment resulted in Akerson'
s
meeting Mr. Hoover and subsequently led to Akerson*
s
appointment as Mr. Hoover's personal secretary during the
Commerce period and press secretary during the Presidential
period. In January 1931, two years into Mr. Hoover's term
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President to accept a job with Paramount Publix Corporation
in New York City. His association with Paramount was
unsuccessful, ending in 1934. This started a long and
bitter terra of unemployment for Akerson. He died in 1941.
These, in brief, are the life events of a
midwestern Norwegian farm boy whose ambition and luck took
him from the farm to the outer offices of the President.
The Newspaper,, Yeagg
Akerson learned his politics during the nine years
that he reported state and municipal government for the
Tribune . His promotion in 1921 to be chief of the
Washington Bureau Service for his paper reflects how well
he had learned his trade. His energy and capacity for work
were his chief assets. To Washington correspondents and
politicians in 1921, he was known as "The Great Nordic
Monsoon." Akerson' s energies evidently could get the most
out of a full day's work and the managing editor of the
Tribune . T. J. Dillon, expressed his praise in a letter of
January 18, 1922
i
Our Washington Bureau Service for the last three or
four days has been so good that I am moved to express
my. satisfaction thereat in my well known millifluous
/sifl/ fashion. We cleaned up on the high dam proposi-
tion in spite of Mr. Cullen to the extent that left
very little meat on the bone for the Journal .
The letter continues with praise for the job that Akerson
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I have been wondering as to the time when you
should come back to Minneapolis to take a hand in the
political fray. Even to my unpracticed eye, it is
obvious that the pot is beginning to simmer. There are
some wild suspicions that Kellogg may not get the
Ramsey county delegation.
2
Akerson can not be described as a political
reporter in the sense that we understand this term today.
He was not a dispassionate observer of the political events
of his day. He reported the political scene, but he was
also part of that scene. He and his Republican newspaper
had vested interests in the Republican campaigns. The
tradition of the newspaper as a political voice remained a
major part of Akerson' s political publicity thinking.
Akerson 1 s political skills and bias were
recognized during the presidential campaign of 1924. He
was then considered so competent about the political
situation in the Midwest that he was called to the Chicago
headquarters of the Republican National Committee to
consult and advise party leaders. His work in Chicago
helped to stem the LaFollette tide in the farm states and
bring the strength of these states to the Coolidge-Dawes
ticket.
President Coolidge expressed his appreciation for
this contribution in a letter written to Akerson on
March 26, 1925:
Your helpful and valued participation in the
publicity work during the late political campaign was
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been, along with those who were intimately associated
with your work, thoroughly appreciative of everything
that you contributed toward the result at the polls.*
It was Akerson's work with the Republican National
Committee that gained him the acquaintanceship of Herbert
Hoover, which two years later would lead to a friendship.
Akerson* 3 successes in the 1924 campaign were also
rewarded by his paper. He was returned to Minneapolis to
serve as the assistant managing editor of the Tribune until
1925.
Political Appointment
Akerson's reputation as a newsman with political
savvy was well established by 1925. In that year, at the
age of thirty-six, Akerson accepted the invitation of
Secretary of State Kellogg to be the Secretary to the
National Sesquicentennial Exhibition Commission at a salary
of $5,000 a year. Akerson evidently worked hard at this
job, for once again his energies and capabilities were
recognized, this time by his future friend, employer, and
President. Herbert Hoover, in a letter to Secretary Kellogg
of June 2, 1926, made this request on Akerson's behalf:
I find that Akerson is devoting practically his
whole time to this Exposition, to the prejudice of his
other earnings, and it is hardly fair to hold him
temporarily on so low a salary as he is now getting.
If you approve I would propose to raise him to the rate
of $7,200.00 a year.
5
For Akerson, this appointment was opportunity











suitable replacement had not as yet been named. Hoover met
Akerson at a time when he most needed the aid of a hard-
working, capable assistant. In October of 1926, George
Akerson* s full-time job carried with it the title
Secretary to Mr. Hoover, Secretary of Commerce.
The Commerce Period—Prelude to the White House
During the Commerce period, Hoover and Akerson
worked well together, traveled with some pleasure together,
and became good friends. But the friendship between this
Presbyterian secretary and Quaker President was not based
on any obvious similarities between the two men. Outlook
magazine lined the two men up as polar opposites:
Hoover is serious, Akerson is showy. Hoover makes
few promises, Akerson makes many. Hoover shakes few
hands, Akerson everybody's. Hoover confers with
statesmen, Akerson soft-soaps politicians.
6
The two men even approached recreation from opposite
extremes. For Hoover, fishing was everything. But
Akerson enjoyed the society of city life and private clubs.
Akerson liked to dress up in the latest fashion and be
seen.
Known as "Gorgeous George, " he is the most
decorative member of President Hoover's three-ring
secretariat. He likes to dress, to impress, to shine
in society. At the moment he is trying to wangle the
President into week-ending at some smart resort where
his own attainments would sparkle more brilliantly than
at secluded fishing pools in Virginia and Maryland.
7
While Hoover was Secretary of Commerce, Akerson was
his personal secretary for three years. It was during
'\
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these three years that the basis for a working relationship
between Hoover and Akerson was established. Some details
of the work accomplished by Akerson during the Commerce
period are given here as a prelude to the description and
evaluation of Akerson' s work during the White House years.
During the Commerce period* the Akerson corres-
pondence can be categorized as the papers of a political
publicist. While it is reasonable to assume that Akerson
performed many secretarial/personal-aide functions for the
Commerce Secretary , such as travel arrangements, appoint-
ments, bread and butter requirements, the collection of
correspondence that has survived in the Akerson Papers
almost entirely reflects the activities of a political
publicist. The following identifies what appears to be the
essence of Akerson* s job as Secretary to Mr. Hoover and is
assumed to be the basis upon which the President-elect
appointed George Akerson to the position of Presidential
Press Secretary.
Prom the fall of 1927 through the spring primaries
of 1928, the summer nominating convention at Kansas City
and the fall elections, Akerson was heavily involved in the
process of nominating and electing a President. The record
is complete and speaks very well for itself. Sample
excerpts have been selected, edited, and organized to
present here a representative description of Akerson' s job
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Since Hoover had never run for a political office,
there was no Hoover political organization in existence to
carry his banner. Although Hoover was honored, respected,
and had been mentioned as "Presidential timber" as early as
1920, there were no "Citizens for Hoover" groups
established, no Hoover headquarters opened, and no Hoover
delegates, precinct captains, and ward workers lined up
prior to 1928. These activities were assumed and accom-
plished through the direction of George Akerson. Evidently
Akerson had been in contact with the power structure within
the states and when the time came to organize, he gave the
signal. This is how it happened in Massachusetts.
Akerson had been in contact with, among others, the
Secretary of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in
Massachusetts, Frank Chase, who would send him clippings
and political information from time to time in 1927
s
Everywhere we hear very favorable comment on Mr.
Hoover's talk before the New England Council. He
certainly had made many new friends up this way,
including the press. The Catholic Bishop in his sermon
Sunday "thanked God for men like Hoover. "8
In January 1928, Akerson gave the signal to set up the
Massachusetts organization, in a letter to Mr. Chases
I believe that we should take advantage of this new
interest /Massachusetts Senator Gillett had just
endorsed Hoovery and proceed with forming a New England




Akerson received detailed information on the














lawyer and early Hoover supporter in Kansas City, sent
Akerson a list of prominent Hoover supporters including
ward committeemen/ ward presidents, and precinct captains
in a letter of January 26, 1923, making this requests
We have quite a number of precinct captains and
ward workers who desire to be assistant sergeants at
arms, door-keepers, and messengers. Can arrangements
be made to take care of them? ... Our present plan is
to proceed to enlarge the committee and to establish an
organization in every wardship and township. 10
Akerson 1 s reply of February 1, 1928, does not respond to
the request but does render his support for their
committees
I shall try to see Wilson of the Kansas City Star
today. ... by all means, the Kansas City star should
proceed with vigor to help you people out. ... As you
know, there is a banquet to be held by the Young
Republicans of Missouri in Jefferson City. I believe
it would be a good idea if some of the representatives
of your organization were there also.il
Akerson was closely involved himself in this political
organization process. He wrote to Charles B. Cheney,
political editor of the Minneapolis Journal . in a
January 19, 1928, letters
Just as soon as we locate headquarters, there will
be some sort of a public announcement. ... Knowing
how much the Journal and you are interested in the
cause, I am hoping that you will give us all the help
you can. 12
As the political organization for Hoover sprang to
life across the country, lists of hometown influent ials
were sent to Akerson. From these lists, Akerson would
select those whom he wished to specifically encourage. The
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and used this standard openings
I am wondering if you would like to do something
for your country. If so* the best way you can do that
is to get busy in your town on behalf of Herbert
Hoover. 13
The political organization functioned closely within the
advice and guidance of Akerson. At the grass roots level,
he had detailed knowledge of the organization and often
exercised his influence. In a March 16, 1928, letter to a
Mr. Bannister, a Denver lawyer, Akerson offered counsel on
the selection of Colorado State Treasurer Hodges as a
possible delegate to the Kansas City Convention:
If you are convinced that Hodges is not an out-and-
out Hoover man (and I am inclined to agree with you
that he is not) then he ought not to be made a
delegate. It is my information that Hodges is playing
the neutral game with certain eastern financial
interests .... This is just for your own confi-
dential information. We want out-and-out Hoover men on
the Colorado delegation just as we want them on every
other delegation in the country. 14
Once the organization was established, it needed to
be nourished with political publicity. The publicity had
to be initiated, circulated, and coordinated. This Akerson
did. Akerson was the distribution point for the following
material. The Akerson Papers contain inventories and
distribution lists of this printed material!
1. Names and addresses of political influentials.
2. Names and addresses of newspaper and magazine
editors.
3. Hoover position papers on various issues.
4. A clip sheet called "The Political Digest."
Contained 6-8 editorials, 10-11 one-sentence
paragraphs from various newspapers, and usually one
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Akerson' s office became the information warehouse out of
which the Hoover organization drew its needs:
Our state /Colorado/ convention will be held here
April 16th and I want to have available all the
information possible having any bearing on "Secretary
Hoover as a Republican" and "Secretary Hoover and the
Farmer" so that should defensive purposes require, I
may have it at my command. 16
Akerson's return letter of March 29, 1928, acknowledged
this request and established one of a series of distribu-
tion centers to cover the nation:
It seems desirable that a small office should be
opened in Denver for purposes of distributing
publicity and general information perhaps with a small
committee of guidance and with such modest financial
support as may be required to be secured locally. Such
an establishment is much desired as a center point for
distribution not alone in Colorado but Arizona,
Wyoming, Montana, and Western Nebraska. The other
states are being served by offices at other points. It
would seem to me that the necessary work could be done
by a part-time newspaperman as the number of newspapers
in the territory is not very large. 17
That Akerson would hire working newspapermen to be on his
publicity team recalls his own career as a political
reporter when he never felt there to be a conflict of
interest when a reporter actively participated in politics.
It seems evident that Akerson watched the
distribution of publicity carefully and gave orders to
insure information moved quickly without any bottlenecks.
By April 1928, he was "on top" of the publicity
organization:
We_are now sending you /Colorado distribution
officfi/ daily packages of material. Will you arrange
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out every day. You can obtain lists of Republican
papers for three states. This is a most important job
to be undertaken right now.iS
Akerson also served as a receiving point for progress
reports on the distribution of publicity. Typical of these
reports is this May 25, 1928. letter from Edward Anthony, a
committee member of the "Hoover for President Club, and a
publisher, printer, and distributor of publicity materials
I thought you would be interested to know that our
material is being widely used in West Virginia. Forty-
four newspapers in that State are carrying our three
column weekly plate and mat service and 37 papers are
carrying our Pictorial Life of Hoover. 19
Akerson was a relay station in the distribution organiza-
tion. He would pass on the techniques that had been used
with success in one state to the publicity people of
another state. Akerson wrote this to Anthonys
I would like to call the attention of your office
to the great importance of seeing to it that the news-
papers who are giving us active support should print
every day a statement of some local citizen as to why
he is for Hoover. These statements should cover all
classes of people, especially at this time, women and
farmers. Where the citizen has more than local
importance these statements should be clipped and
circulated to other friendly newspapers in the area
where he is known.
This was the sole basis of the Cleveland publicity
campaign, and it proved tremendously effective. 20
Some of the states reported the results of their research
to Akerson. This also helped him make decisions.
About a week ago, we polled all the N.Y. staters
who are in Who's Hbja.. ... so far we have received
1,134 replies. Of these, 830 unqualifiedly expressed
themselves as being strongly pro-Hoover. The State
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which will serve a double purpose. First, it will give
us material for several good news stories? second, it
gives us the names of many important friends that we
did not know about. 2 !
The publicity effort which Akerson guided was not
just a passive "clip and send" organization* but it
actively participated in the political process.
Throughout the Commerce period, Akerson maintained
a close contact with the members of the working press.
This contact provided the feedback on rumors and intrigues
needed in politics. During the spring of 1923, Akerson *s
contact with W. Turner Cat ledge of the editorial department
of the Baltimore &u& represented the kind of intimate
contact Akerson maintained with some members of the press.
Catledge's letter of March 1, 1928, sets the tone of this
contacts
As the thing started warming up today, I resolved
to write you and I trust that you will not take this as
any meddling for Z have nothing else in mind than to
acquaint you with the facts here and to become
acquainted if I may with the attitude there. Of
course, if there is anything wise to be published, as a
newspaperman with his horns ever out, I would like the
break. But until you expressly tell me the latter, I
shall say nothing but shall keep trying to see all.
Should it come to the point where I could be of any
service to you here, you know, George, that your
slightest wish is a command and that your cause and the
cause of Herbert Hoover is my cause, thenceforth and
forever more. Amen. . . .22
This collection of letters, memos, lists,
inventories, and press clippings suggests that Akerson was
a well-organised, efficient, active participant in a major
hUMj V.l>>v i fO£
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publicity effort to get Hoover nominated. Akerson had the
"know how** neceaaary to organise and activate political
publicity. The impact of this effort ia difficult to
measure , but Hoover was nominated and was elected and
perhaps that was convincing evidence for the President-
elect.
In George Akerson, for whatever the consequences*
Mr. Hoover had choaen the man he wanted to sit in his outer
office, one who should know the value and the dangers of
publicity and could monitor the trends of public opinion.
Hoover had chosen his intermediary with the press and his
counsel for information policy.
Before the secretaryship of the first press
secretary can be described and evaluated, some pause must
be given to the perplexing paradoxes of hia "chief and the
complexities of the Great Depression, neither press
secretary nor President could extricate themselves from the
events of their tiroes.
Akerson 's story is written within the constraints
of pressure, conflict, complexities, and frustrations
discussed earlier and also within the qualifiers of Herbert
Hoover and the Great Depreasion.
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CHAPTER III
HERBERT HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
In the memory bank of most Americans* the account
marked "Hoover* is a long record of deposits made before
1929 and after 1932* as well as a long list of withdrawals
made from 1929 to 1932. The Hoover fondly remembered in
popular history is the accomplished engineer who
modernised the mining industries of Australia and China*
the humanitarian who organized the Belgium Relief Fund to
save starving children in Europe* the great organizer who
made the economizing plans of the Food Administration
work* the executive who expanded the scope and powers of
the Commerce Department* the special assistant to
Presidents who headed numerous commissions* and the kindly
senior amongst former Presidents whose birthday
celebrations annually occasioned laudatory editorials and
cartoon tributes. But another Hoover also exists in the
American memory—the Hoover of the Great Depression* the
man who sat by in frustrated idleness while Americans lost
their farms* businesses* and life savings. When he was
Food Administrator* Hoover was so closely associated with
the virtue of economizing that a new word was coined. To
41
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"Hooverize" meant to be patriotic and economize to help the
war effort. When he was President* Hoover was so closely
identified with the deprivations of the depression that the
huts and shacks of the miserably unemployed were called
"Hoovervilles. " Had Hoover not been elected President* his
bank account with the American people would have been a
long* continuous record of deposits. But he did become the
thirty- first President of the United States and it is the
nature of this presidency that concerns this study*
1928 Campaign
The presidential campaign of 1928 was remarkable in
two ways: Herbert C. Hoover and Alfred E. Smith, For the
Democrats there was Al Smith* a colorful* popular* Irish
Catholic; he had formerly been associated with Tammany Hall
but he was a respected governor of New York. Por the
Republicans there was Herbert Hoover* the respected and
popular Food Administrator and Secretary of Commerce for
Presidents Harding and Coolidge* but Hoover was not "Mr.
Republican." He believed in the free enterprise system and
the non-intervention of government* but Hoover was not a
conservative in the Calvin Coolidge tradition. Old Guard
Republicans never felt too secure about Hoover's political
stripe. The party loyalties of a man who had never run for
an elected office must have seemed a little unreliable to













The most unremarkable thing about the Hoover-Smith
election was that Hoover won the clear mandate of the
people because the party in power was riding a wave of
prosperity. If a change was needed, the burden of proof
was on the Democrats and the Irish Catholic candidate lost
his case for a change.
Economic Panic and Depression
Hoover had little opportunity to enjoy his victory
or for that matter little time in which to put his house in
order before the events of a crisis crashed down on his
administration. The peak of the stock market was reached
in 1928; the collapse which came in 1929 seemed unbeliev-
able. Yet, on October 24, 1929, "Black Thursday," more
than sixteen million shares of stock turned over in Wall
Street as the market plunged downward. The rout was on.
The panic triggered a list of events that became known as
the Great Depressions unemployment, bread lines, bank
failures, dropping farm prices, and relief. The mood of a
desperate nation in 1931 and 1932 was said to be revolu-
tionary. But no revolution came. Instead, a majority of
the electorate switched allegiance from the party of
Herbert C. Hoover to the party of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
On the day that Hoover left the White House, March 4, 1933,
virtually every bank in America was closed.
The thirty- first presidency ended in bitter,
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have survived the shock of the Depression is a plausible
but overly simple answer. A depression is not an automatic
consequence of a stock market crash. The magnitude of the
1932 failure was not an inevitability of the 1929 panic.
Hoover had the necessary power and resources in 1929 to
preclude the sequence of events that went from economic
panic to depressions a Republican Congress* a cooperative
and friendly press, and a clear mandate from the people.
Yet Hoover could not activate his will with Congress* the
press* or the people. He had lost his credibility as a
leader and this rendered him helpless. It was not the
events of the Depression that led to this credibility loss
but rather a combination of failures that immobilized the
President.
aoover's Public Relations frofeiemji
President Hoover had serious public relations
failures. In part* these failures explain his inability to
control the events of his administration. Publicity and
politics* in one form or another, determined most of
Hoover's public relations problems during the presidency.
As Food Administrator and as Secretary of Commerce*
Hoover's political and publicity efforts had been effective*
but as President* Hoover was a somewhat reluctant public
and political man.
Hoover had always been a well-motivated public
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servant , but during his presidency when he most needed to
make some of his service public and his politics effective,
he faltered, allowing information and power vacuums to form
and be filled with erroneous, harmful speculation. Hoover
failed to realize that, like it or not, he had to work in
the full glare of public scrutiny. Ignoring this reality
was at the heart of his public relations problems.
Suspicion, distrust, and resentment were the conditions
created by the political and publicity reluctance of the
President which developed when the storm broke. The public
relations problems that developed from the President's
reluctance to use his full powers as a public and political
man limited the effectiveness of both the President and the
press secretary.
First a look at Hoover the public man. Ironically,
the publicity build-up that made the 1928 campaign a success
also helped to make the 1932 campaign a failure. Nothing
is more dangerous in the strategy of public relations than
to excite expectations that cannot be realized. In 1928,
Hoover was pictured as the Great Humanitarian, the Great
Problem Solver, and the Great Engineer. Later, all of
these great images took on bitter double meanings in the
press. His international acclaim and his successful
association with three Presidents made him a ready subject
for a big publicity build-up. The gap between promise and
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contributed to the administration's public relations
problems. Hoover's options to speak and act as a credible
leader were limited by the unrealistic image he was
measured against.
While it is true that the 1928 campaign used
political publicity methods to accomplish its ends. Hoover
was more naturally a private man than a public one. Once
in the White House* his natural tendencies toward privacy
became evident and more often than not he would decline to
use the full publicity powers that his office commanded.
Hoover defined the dignity of his office in rather narrow
terms for a twentieth century President. When asked to
reply to some criticism made of himself or of his methods
that appeared in the press, his standard response was. BA
President cannot with decency and with the proper regard
2for the dignity of his office reply to such stuff. w
Aloof dignity was a quality that the President not
only practiced but was one in which he received some
measure of support, as seen in this editorial from the
Saturday Evening £a&t of July 6. 1929s
Finally, there seems to us no great wisdom in
frequent or promiscuous speech-making on the
President's part. It is all very well for the kings
and princes of Europe to make neat little corner-stone
oration. But our President has no Prime Minister. He
should speak on a great occasion only, and where he has
something definite to say.
The Akerson Papers provided an interesting side-
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Hoover administration. In an undated memo to the T»yl*>yine
staff signed by Akerson as assistant managing editor* he
said* MThe office of the Presidency, along with Kings and
Popes, shall be accorded the dignity of a capital P.;
3governor and mayor shall remain lower case."
Hoover's unwillingness as President to publicise
himself in the press resulted in an information vacuum
about his personality* When hard times came and the
President did not bring relief, a disheartened, bitter,
economically ravaged public was ready to believe Hoover to
be cold-hearted, dispassionate, unfeeling, and sullen.
Before the public relations aspects of Hoover the
political man can be discussed, one quality about Hoover's
political personality needs to be made clear. Hoover was
an activist within a very rigid framework of Ideology? he
acted on the basis of his beliefs and only on that basis.
His pragmatism, what little he had of it, emerged only
after the prodding of great events. In short. Hoover was
not a pragmatic, consensus politicians
Perhaps the puzzle of Hoover is to be explained by
the fact that he was in a way the first President who
took his ideology seriously. The American political
tradition had been pragmatic? we dealt with whatever
came in whatever way seemed to be appropriate, using
the government as an instrument if need be. Hoover,
however, adhered to principle.
4
It was this adherence to principle that limited
Hoover's manipulation of the political forces of the
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presidency. There was no limit to the effort Hoover would
spend to persuade a political opponent with facts, details,
and logical arguments, but the paucity of political
bargaining and applied pressures in this argument was
equally striking. Armed with the facts and the powers of
reasoning, it was Hoover's belief that Congressmen, party
leaders, businessmen, reporters, and voters would make the
right decision. Acting from this principle produced
particularly disastrous results with Congress. Charles
Michelson, publicity director of the Democratic National
Committee, in his political column for the New York World ,
prefaced some political criticism he had of Hoover with the
argument that a successful President must be able to use
his political power, he must be a great politician in the
finest sense of the word. It is the power of politics that
enables him to function as an equal with the other branches
of government. Michelson points out in his book, The Ghost
Talks , the tradition of the political relationship between
the presidency and the Congress?
T. R. bullied his Congress, Wilson impressed them,
Harding fraternized with them, Coolidge understood
their political problems. But Hoover had no knack of 5dominating the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Michelson tried to put Hoover's political ineptitude in
perspective:
. . . hard-driving, intelligent individual with a
splendid capacity for handling a definite state of
facts, and he is a master at arranging them and
--
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coordinating. But in the business of persuading
Congress by pressure of political friends and naviga-
tion amid the pride and personal concern of his cabinet
members, he was helpless. The intangibles were beyond
him. He did not know how to overcome opposition. ...
But like all amateurs at the art of politics, he feared
antagonisms for which he had no slide rule of
calculations .
6
Hoover's political reluctance seemed to perpetuate
criticism. One of the earliest critics against Hoover's
use of Commissions grounds the criticism in the President's
political ineptitudes
He was very successful in organizing philanthropic
projects in which everyone believed, that he handled
admirably problems solvable by blueprints. But stacked
up against problems that involve the handling of men
with strong wills and able intellects opposed to him,
Mr. Hoover seemed to have no refuge except to appoint a
commission.
7
The lack of political leadership from the White
House and the President's refusal to act and respond within
the traditions of a political man gave credibility to the
Democrats' charge that he was a "do-nothing" President, a
President who sat idly by while his countrymen lost their
wealth. Later critics would infer that the "do-nothing"
President was lazy, inept, and indifferent. These were the
speculations that filled the political vacuum Hoover
created. When his political powers went unused, they
atrophied to the point where he could not activate Congress
to support his recovery plans even in the face of national
disaster.
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of the Depression so much as the consequence of the
Presidents public relations failures in the areas of
politics and publicity once he got to the White House,
These failures so limited and inhibited the President's
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PRESS SECRETARY* JANUARY 1929 TO JANUARY 1931
The White House Secretariat
The appointment of George Akerson to the position
of Presidential Press Secretary was announced on
January 2, 1929. This position was established as part of
Herbert Hoover's new concept of how the executive business
of -the President should be best accomplished. Former
Presidents had employed a White House clerical staff
headed by a personal secretary to the President. Hoover
was to change this. He brought corporate organization to
the White House. Hoover wanted executive level
assistance.
Congress made President Hoover's innovative
"Secretariat possible by authorizing three additional
executive aides to the President. Each of these three was
2to receive an official salary of $10,000 a year. This
brought to four the number of executive level presidential
secretaries.
Reaction to this new business approach was mixed.
While it was not a major issue of controversy in the press,
there was some comment
t
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White House of a Big Executive should see an
accompanying enlargement of office quarters* expansion
of equipment* and massing of secretarial help. In
bygone days the President had a secretary. ... But
that was in the days before the Super Administrator*
before Efficiency came to the White House.
3
A less cynical evaluation* but one from a Hoover supporter*
applauds bringing the new business techniques to the White
House:
He had to have three additional secretaries because
they simplified his expanded relationship with public
and private affairs. Avid for information* he had to
provide his own sources* and also the human pipeline
through which data could flow to him in condensed and
workable form. Furthermore* he needed a link with
experts for the program of social betterment which is
so close to his heart. The whole secretarial system*
therefore* elucidates his theory of utilization of
every factor at his command for service .4
The authorization and appointment of this new
secretariat called for an enlargement and remodeling of the
White House office space to physically accommodate the
additions. This enlargement construction went on through
the summer and autumn of 1929* and included the remodeling
of press facilities.
The American Mercury Magazine gave this description
of the new press rooms
The room on the right has been turned into a ritzy
loge for the press. Its walls of amber tint are hung
with autographed likenesses of Harding* Coolidge*
J. Bascorn Slemp and other departed immortals. A rich
yellowish carpet and new typewriter desks help to dress
the room but the boys are not especially happy with it.
It's all too fancy. There are gaboons and waist-high
ash trays all about* but who wants to get up from a
card game to make sure he doesn't miss the receptable*
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The four men appointed to the new secretarial
positions had equal authority and responsibility in the
White House organization. None enjoyed seniority over any
of the others. While each secretary did have his separate
areas of responsibility* there was some overlapping of
functions. Since Akerson was responsible for the
President's appointment calendar as well as White House
press relations* he had to work closely with the other
three secretaries. Some introduction to these three men
and their jobs is given here as description of the
immediate working conditions of the press secretary.
The correspondence secretary* Lawrence Richey* was
in charge of all correspondence prepared for the President's
signature. Richey 's previous employment as a Secret Service
agent and Mr. Hoover's many references to him as "my trouble
man" led to this kind of speculation about Richey *s
specific duties in American Mttxcury Magazine:
He was Mr. Hoover's confidential agent* his gum-
shoe man* the major domo of his private affairs* his go-
between and policeman. • • • He is in a vantage place
from which he can and does maintain a constant and all-
pervading scrutiny of White House personnel. ...
Indefatigable* a trained and experienced investigator*
unobtrusive as a fleeting shadow. ... No one in any
way connected with the White House* it is said* is
exempt from this surveillance. Even the reporters
assigned are under his eye. 7
Perhaps the most accurate description of Mr. Richey 's job
is this brief description written in Review &£ Revlews 2
In addition to his secretarial duties at the White
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personal contact duties for the President. He will
also serve as personal bodyguard and a member of the
•"Medicine Ball Cabinet."8
Prench Strother was appointed by President Hoover
to the position of research assistant. Strother had been
the editor of World's Work magazine. His job was to
provide the President with research data on a great variety
of subjects. Hoover's approach to the decision-making
process was first to collect all available facts. The
President employed Strother to mobilize men, facts, and
agencies to provide the kind of information the President
felt he needed before he could decide the issues of his
administration.
Walter Newton, like George Akerson, served Hoover
as an intermediary; Newton's clientele was Congressmen. He
resigned his membership to the House of Representatives
from Minnesota to serve as President Hoover's legislative
liaison assistant. Of his political qualifications, there
were two views
t
... no man knows better the technique and
psychology of the legislative game. ... He was a
member of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce when Hoover was Secretary of Commerce. . . •
Newton collaborated with Hoover on the famous rubber
report which indicated the British control of an
essential commodity.
^
Mr. Newton is the perfect type of Farm Belt
politician. He talks much about the need of Farm
Relief and yet when he was in the House he voted for
the Hawley tariff bill, one of the most bold-faced
steals ever attempted on the farmer and against the
debenture plan, a device which would have applied the
















Newton and Akerson had known each other in Minneapolis when
Akerson had worked for the Tribune . There is some reason
to believe that Akerson had a part in the Newton appoint-
ment since many of the political tasks that Newton was
charged with in the White House had been part of Akerson 's
job during the Commerce days.
These, then, were the men who shared the outer
offices of the White House with George Akerson. Each was
an innovator in some aspect of running the business of the
presidency. Each had an area of primary responsibility—
Richey as correspondence secretary, Strother as research
secretary, Newton as political secretary, and Akerson as
press secretary. When viewed in combination, these four
men served to relieve the President of routine details,
supply him with factual information, project his views on
occasion, and thereby give him the latitude of action he
required to activate his style of presidential leadership.
The Press Secretary's Routine Correspondence
Akerson* s White House correspondence is not a
continuation of the kind of work he did during the Commerce
period. Political party publicity is not the primary
effort of Akerson' s job at the White House. While there is
no way to recreate the total routine of the first press
secretary from the surviving record, some inferences can be
made. The following description of Akerson' s routine
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correspondence is based on the official White House
correspondence clearly bearing Akerson's action.
The most obvious inference is that Akerson was a
point of contact and a buffer between the President and his
various publics. Although this description can also be
applied to the other members of the secretariat* it was a
crucial part of Akerson's routine as appointments
secretary and as press secretary. The content of this
official correspondence suggests that the press secretary's
routine was as much determined by service to the
President's various publics as it was to the President
himself.
To aid in the description of this large and varied
collection of correspondence, three general subject
categories have been noted which help identify the areas of
responsibility given to Akerson. These three categories
are Akerson 'ss
(1) action on routine requests,
(2) mediation of press problems* and
(3) facilitation of press policy.
The first category, Akerson's action on routine
requests* numerically represents the greatest portion of
the correspondence. A sampling of this request corres-
pondence is presented here as illustrative of what was
probably some of the simple routine but time-consuming
part of Akerson's work. This selection was made on the
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basis of variety and representiveness. Each selection
represents a kind of routine request* Selections were made
only if there were at least fifteen pieces of correspondence
of the same kind in the Akerson and Presidential Papers.
The survey indicated that the following list of
categories could be identified according to this criterion!
1. Requests that the President accept an honorary
club membership.
2. Requests that the President be a guest speaker.
3. Requests for an autographed presidential
photograph.
4. Requests that the President endorse an
organization or cause.
5. Requests that the President or Akerson inter-
cede on behalf of an individual seeking a job.
6. Requests for a personal appointment with the
President.
7. Requests that the President accept some kind of
a gift.
In content* these are the kinds of requests
Akerson acted on in his capacity as press secretary and
appointments secretary. Most of the correspondence seemed
perfunctory in nature; usually the letters were a standard
kind of reply that bore Akerson *s signature. This was a
public relations, service routine that did not require the
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roust have consumed the time and energies of the press
secretary.
Of the remaining two categories of correspondence/
mediating press problems and facilitating press policy ,
there are far fewer pieces of correspondence. The number/
content/ and variety of this correspondence precludes
applying the measurement standards of the request corres-
pondence. In addition/ the collection of these two types
of correspondence was not complete. The examples
presented here are not typical of the content of the
problems Akerson mediated or the policies he facilitated
but are illustrative of the process of mediation and
facilitation.
It was as press secretary that Akerson most often
found himself in the position of mediator. Although the
President is never mentioned in the letters/ the implica-
tion is that Akerson is mediating a problem between the
President and the press. Usually/ the dissatisfied party
is the President. Akerson* s letter of May 8/ 1929, to
Byron Price of the AP Bureau in Washington, D. C, is
interesting in its date—the administration was hardly two
months old:
Some means must be found to prevent premature
publication of the President's speeches/ even if the
White House has to take steps to see that the guilty of
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Akerson also came to mediate between agents of the press.
The content of this kind of correspondence was usually one
agent registering a complaint about another agent with the
White House. In November 1929, the president of
United Press Association, K. A. Bickel, wrote to Akerson:
A very serious situation exists in South America
where the Havas Agency has apparently frequently
released President Hoover *s addresses not moments but
upwards of an hour in advance of the release date and
apparently are doing this persistently. It ought to be
easy for you to determine directly how the Havas Agency
receives these speeches and establish the responsibil-
ity for the Havas Agency, if the Havas Agency cannot be
made directly responsible to the White House. Very
frankly, we are not going to continue to permit Havas
Agency to continuously place the UP, or rather the
clients of the UP, in a ridiculous position by their
constant violations of the release pledge in Brazil and
Argentina. 12
Akerson mediated this problem between Havas and UPA through
a series of letters and evidently with some personal
contact. In his letter to the Washington, D. C,
representative, Akerson wrote
:
I have two most serious complaints to the effect
that the Havas Hews Agency broke the release on the
President's Armistice Day speech in Europe and also in
South America. I want to go into the whole matter with
you and through you, with your representatives in N.Y.
If the Havas News Agency continues to break press
releases, I have to see that they are not extended the
courtesy of advances from the White House .13
When the President had a grievance, when the press
had a grievance, Akerson acted on the problem; not always
to the satisfaction of the grievants or even to the
solution of the problem, but this kind of mediation was a


















iSDfifivbe .. o vb^i -





. XA 5o *?aq
61
Facilitating White House press policy also
contributed to Akerson* s correspondence routine. The main
thrust of press policy concerned the press conference and
will be discussed in a later chapter. But Akerson also
implemented a variety of press decisions on other matters.
In October of 1929/ the Commissioner of Education of
Massachusetts wrote to Akerson noting a statement in the
public press to the effect that it would be the policy of
the President to disregard letters publicized before they
were received by him and requested to be advised whether
this policy was given out by the President to the press or
14
whether it appeared in official correspondence. Akerson
replied with this policy statements
The President made it plain to the press that this
policy /disregarding letters publicized before being
received by the President/ would be followed from now
on. Considerable publicity was given to that official
White House announcement.^
The question of release dates was a recurring
policy problem for Akerson. Often he would try to
anticipate the problem by attaching this kind of transmit-
tal note to whatever the release might bet
Caution to editors:
Your attention is respectfully called to the
release for the Budget Message. The Message is neces-
sarily dated Dec. 2nd, the date of the opening of
Congress. It will not be read until Dec. 4th at
earliest. It must not be confused with the President's
Message, which will likely be released at noon on
Dec. 3rd. I call your attention to the Budget Message
release in order that there may be no violation of said























Except for the correspondence dealing with the
operation of the press conference, this resume describes
the official Akerson correspondence in the record during
the White House years. This is not the record of a man
who was close to the decision-making process, as was true
during the Commerce period. While Akerson was an active
participant during the Commerce period, his role in the
White House seemed to be more one of a passive agent. Some
of this initiative had been absorbed by a strong President
who actively preferred to accomplish his press objectives
in private dealings between himself and the publishers.
Additionally, some of this initiative had been assumed by
the other presidential secretaries. Newton and Strother
participated in some aspects of the press secretary's job
and assumed duties that had been Akerson' s during the
Commerce period.
It is assumed that Secretary Newton accomplished
the political publicity activity in which Akerson was so
heavily involved in the Commerce period. None of the
political contacts who contributed to the Commerce period
correspondence appear in Akerson 's White House corres-
pondence. The many files on the political organizations in
the various states are not duplicated in his White House
files. There is no file on the Republican National
Committee nor on James West, the director of publicity for
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political party records are rarely kept completely intact,
the complete lack of any political publicity records of the
kind maintained during the Commerce period makes it more
probable that the political and party aspects of the
President's publicity were handled by someone else. The
most likely person would have been Walter Newton. Since
Newton was specifically charged with the responsibility of
presidential political appointments, it is likely that the
political obligations incurred by Akerson during the
Commerce period were "paid off" by Newton during the White
House period.
The Research Secretary, French Strother, routinely
handled books and magazine articles to be published about
the President. Authors would seek the President's
cooperation through the research secretary. Review of the
material before publication would also be made by
17Strother. There is no evidence to suggest that this
arrangement caused any contention between Akerson and
Strother. As the former editor of World's Work , it
probably seemed natural that Strother take over this kind
of job.
It was Strother, not Akerson, who was charged with
the effort of watching and reporting public opinion to the
President « As part of his research job, Strother studied


















political faith* representing a total circulation of nearly
15.000*000.
Under Strother's direction* offices were established
in a Washington office building to study editorial comment.
Here the newspapers were delivered every day* reviewed for
items relating to national questions* and clipped
accordingly. The clippings were sorted according to
subject and pasted on sheets. From these sheets* research-
ers with newspaper experience made typewritten digests
which were laid on the President's desk twice a day. These
digests were then compiled into a running survey of public
opinion on various national issues. These surveys were
duplicated* but their distribution beyond the President is
18
not known.
Unlike his predecessors* Hoover was not satisfied
that he could read public opinion from the few newspapers
he could read daily* from his own callers* and from his own
correspondence. Nor could he rely on the traditional White
House news and editorial clipping approach. It is to
Hoover *s credit that he tried to systematize the process of
reading public opinion. The fallacy of this approach*
however* was equating the editorial opinion of newspapers
with public opinion.
Strother* Newton* and the President preempted some
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Akerson participated heavily during the Commerce
period in political party publicity. He did relatively
little of this in the White House. During the Commerce
years, Akerson had very little direct contact with the
Washington press corps. The Secretary of Commerce met with
them informally and frequently. There was never any
indication that Akerson was present during these press
meetings. A review of the periodical literature before
1929 shows that Akerson' s name is not listed in any of the
magazines or newspapers. It is probable that during the
Commerce period, Akerson was nothing more to the reporters
than an ex-newspaperman employed in the outer office. But
this changed during the White House years when Akerson*
s
job was almost exclusively press relations with the
Washington correspondents including the planning and
operation of twice-weekly presidential press conferences
and twice-daily press secretary briefings.
Preas Relations
Washington, D. C, is the site of a great and
continuing struggle between government officials and the
Washington press corps. What is finally reduced to a
contest between reporters skilled in ferreting and
officials adept in straddling is known as press relations.
Officials and newspapermen meet essentially for conflicting







time as he can reveal information that will most favorably
reflect on him. Guided by traditional news values, the
reporter is interested in precisely that type of news which
19the official is least eager to reveal.
Herbert Hoover came to the White House at a time
when press representation in the capitol was being extended
in cities of medium size and in small cities above 25,000
20population. Hoover faced a growing corps of competent
newsmen representing a variety of news agencies.
From his press experience as Secretary of Commerce
and as a Republican campaigner, the President had a ready
appreciation for the power and the workings of the press.
At the first of eight Gridiron Dinners that Hoover attended
as President in the spring of 1929, he revealed with some
good humor his relationship to the press:
And I have found in all the representatives of the
press at all times a desire to be helpful in most
unexpected ways. For instance, they daily assist me
beyond my greatest hopes by their suspicious research
work in new implications for my most carefully
formulated phrases. I discover by the time an idea of
mine has filtered through the clear and crystal minds
of one hundred different correspondents, that partic-
ular idea throbs with a sense of courage and public
service, that it has sinister implications, that it is
filled with personal bias, that it bristles with
idealism, sanity and progress. When I take refuge in
silence, the gentlemen of the press again assist me by
the workings of their own speculation. 21
In a more serious mood a year later, Hoover wrote
of the need for a strong, independent press in a letter to
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The steadily rising standards of journalism are an
encouragement to those who believe that the press
should be not only one of the most powerful agencies in
the life of the people but also one rendering the
highest possible service through the dissemination of
constructive thought in science, social advance, and
civic idealism. The greatest challenge to the
ingenuity of the journalist is to make these things as
interesting to the public as are the more familiar
subjects which apparently must be treated in terms of
conflict. I am happy to believe that continual
progress is being made in that direction by the
press. 22
If the story of Mr. Hoover's press relations had to
be predicted in 1929, there would be sound evidence to
speculate a success story: he had a good working record
with the press, he understood their needs, and he
appreciated their power. Yet failure was the fulfillment
of this prediction, not success. In 1937, Leo C. Rosten
wrote this comment on Hoover's press relations failure in
Fublic Opinion Quarterly*
Herbert Hoover was aware of the technique of press
relations. It was only after Mr. Hoover, as
President, alienated the press corps by a series of
surprising inept acts that they turned against
him. ... He resorted to high-handed measures and a
rank antagonizing of the correspondents which brought
down a storm of protest. 23
As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover enjoyed the
respect and confidence of the newspapermen, who regarded
him as one of the best news sources in Washington. Mr.
Hoover's good press during the Secretary of Commerce period
generally conveyed the image of an efficient, experienced,
business executive; a trusted public servant, an adminis-
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Anderson/ in an article written for Nation in 1931/
described the easy, productive relationship Hoover had with
the press as Secretary of Commerce:
Long before the death of Harding, it became the
custom of a group of correspondents, including some of
the ablest in the business, to gather several after-
noons each week in Hoover's office. There he talked
freely not only about his own department but about the
departments of his colleagues in the cabinet and about
the affairs of the Presidency, ... He was the best
"grapevine" in Washington, and a perfect goldmine of
"graveyard stuff." He was able, moreover, invariably
to convey the impression that he knew what he was
talking about. Gradually ... an impression pervaded
the Washington press corps, just as it had pervaded
their editors and the American public, that Hoover knew
more about the affairs of the government and the
actual condition of the country and the world than any
other man in the administration. 25
The press, along with the public, had rising
expectations about the new President. Considering the good
press relations Hoover had as Secretary of Commerce, how
generous he was with his time and information, and how he
seemed to appreciate the correspondent's news function, it
was with some good reason that they expected the end of the
dull, meaningless, presidential press conferences of the
Coolidge era. The press felt confident that their close
and productive relationship with the Secretary of Commerce
would continue with the President. But Hoover the President
was quite different from Hoover the Secretary of Commerce.
Hoover took the dignity of his new office seriously and
literally. Except for a few chosen favorites, he held







»rf woxf bnfi v ,5 9WX^ BXl
•xcfns
sao; »* * r XooD











Presidency made him extremely thin-skinned about criticism.
Hoover believed the Presidency as well as the incumbent was
damaged by criticism. His presidential skin* under the
pressures of the Depression* thinned to a dangerous
shearness. It was well known by the working press that the
President would track down the source of criticism and
apply whatever pressures he could with publishers. The
President was attentive to the press and knew its powers.
In a telegram to Roy Howard of Scripps-Howard Newspapers
,
the President's sensitivity and response to criticism is
demonstrated
:
The country deserves an apology from the Washington
Bureau of the United Press for an attempt this morning
to ascribe personal and partisan politics to the
proposal of the United States government of construc-
tive action to end this depression and to reestablish
social and economic order to the world. I am
confident that you as head of that service do not your-
self approve such activities by your agents. 26
The President drew sharp criticism from the press on this
point from Washington correspondent Paul Y. Andersons
Knowing that the newspapers made him, he assumes
they can with equal ease destroy him. In this he is
mistaken. ... Such is the nature of this humorless
and resentful man that he must know the worst that is
said of him, must take steps to anticipate or prevent
its repetition and must, if possible, punish the
responsible author. 27
Tension between the President and the press came
early and escalated. Aside from the great and complicated
issues of depression, tariff reform, and prohibition which



















immediate working relationship between the reporter and the
President was strained by annoyances on both sides*
Most of all/ Mr. Hoover disliked being the subject
of publicity!
All the wiles of correspondents could not persuade
Herbert Hoover to pose for pictures as are commonly
taken of campaigners . • .All through the campaign he
has been the most elusive figure veteran press men and
photographers have ever pursued .28
President Hoover would not allow his staff to publicize any
of the numerous human interest stories connected with his
adventures in China or his many humanitarian acts during
the Belgium Relief days. As President/ he deliberately
29
avoided the spotlight.
Hoover added great tensions to his relations with
the press by insisting on his privacy. While it may have
been true in theory that he was entitled to privacy in the
White House and at his fishing retreat on the Rapidan River
in Virginia^ the fact is that the more he struggled to
assert his privacy/ the more he advertised his sensitive-
ness and the less his privacy was respected.
Early in his term/ Hoover began to make unannounced
automobile trips to his fishing camp on the Rapidan River
in Virginia. Often/ reporters were left behind. Stories
of reporters chasing the President's car at fifty-five
miles per hour began to appear. The speed of the
President's "flying cavalcade" received wide publicity when














serious injury during a chase to the Rapidan. Additionally,
no accommodations for the press were made at the fishing
camp.
At the Rapidan camp, which became a kind of week-
end White House, the correspondents were kept at a
distance. Trying to report the President of the United
States became a matter of long-range guesses which had
little factual substance and less official support. ^^
The reporters were quartered thirty-three miles from the
President's camp with very little communications
31facilities either to the camp or to the outside world.
This situation never corrected itself and bad feelings
persisted. The President resented the invasion of his
privacy and the correspondents were annoyed by the lack of
cooperation.
The situation at the Rapidan was the beginning of a
continuing struggle between the press and the President
over his privacy. When the reporters had no real news to
report from the White House, they would file stories about
the President asking carpenters to stop work on White House
repairs so that he might take a nap, or the First Lady
taking sound tests to study and improve her speaking voice,
or they would write about the dog from the presidential
kennel biting a Marine. The reporters even disclosed that
there was a patch in one of the White House curtains. The
authors of these reports were ferreted out by the President
32
and in some cases were reprimanded by their newspapers.









President's belief that the personal details of a
President's life were not appropriate press material. On
March 22, 1933/ he wrote this to Mr. Hoover*
I have heard that a number of men covering the
press conference, and even those who have decided to go
along with Roosevelt are fearful. They believe that
before very long there will be some slip which will
make him look ridiculous. Some of these men have the
same fear insofar as the weekly press conferences which
are held by Mrs. Roosevelt are concerned. The first
lady apparently insists on being in the limelight at
least every other day. Her daughter, Mrs. Dall, has
also started_her_ broadcasting. Apparently the whole
family are /sic/ publicity mad. 33
And again Akerson wrote to Hoover on April 24,
1933, his opinion on this kind of White House publicity
t
Newsreel pictures come out of the White House on
the least provocation. One of the boys told me that
Mrs. Roosevelt can be put into pictures anytime. She
arranges them herself if she is not asked. Roosevelt
himself posed and talked three times in two days
recently. I think the public will gradually tire of
that sort of stuff. 34
Another contributing factor to the President's
poor press relationship is noted by Harold Brayman,
Washington correspondent of the New York Evening Post t
The President had "favorites" and "assistant
favorites" among White House correspondents. To the
former went invitations to the White House and the
Presidential camp on the Rapidan. The latter were
those who went to the office of Secretary Akerson to
pick up stray enlightenment about the minor workings
of Mr. Hoover's mind. Hardly more than a dog. 35
The "favorites" noted by Brayman were also called the
"White House Pen Men's Association." The membership
included Mark Sullivan, New York Herald ? William Hard,














Sun ? Richard V. Oulahan, New York Timeg ? Roy Roberts,
36Kansas City Star * and Roy Vernon/ Chicago News .
The press was only too aware of the privileged
access these men had to the President. At the July 5, 1929,
press conference, in response to a reporter asking who
would be the President's guests at the Rapidan camp for the
coming weekend, the President replied
s
Walter Newton and Vernon Kellogg. I am also taking
Bill Hard and Mark Sullivan for general entertain-*
ment . 37
Then too, and perhaps more serious, was the charge
that Hoover made promises and statements to newsmen that
proved to be less than true when the full facts became
known. Drew Pearson and Robert Allen, in their book
Washington Merry-Go-Round, noted these two instances*
There was the memorable statement of 1929 that he
was going to pare army costs ... But when some months
later the budget was submitted to Congress, it was
found that army costs had not been reduced. ...
In the case of the alleged suspended cruisers,
reporters for the New York Evening Post and the New
York Sun discovered that no orders had gone out to the
Navy Department to stop work on them, but, on the
contrary, all preparation for the construction of
vessels was going forward as per schedule. 38
George Manning cited this example in Editor &
Publisher:
Hoover denied having received a letter from FDR,
then Governor of New York, concerning negotiations
between the U. S. and Canada regarding St. Lawrence
River waterway project. When Governor Roosevelt
announced that he would make public his copy of the
letter, the White House admitted that the letter had
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denied knowledge of the letter and, at the same time,
denied that there had been any negotiations ,39
in his book, Washington Correspondents* Leo Rosten
complained that "Mr. Hoover's figures on unemployment, the




The President was prone to call for news
moratoriums on national issues for various reasons. When
the tariff bill became hopelessly bogged down in
congressional debate, he remained silent in order to
preserve the integrity of the legislative processes from
the persuasion of the executive. Hoover made this explan-
ation at his March 22, 1929, press conference:
I already tried to make it clear that in matters of
major public policy the Executive should be the first
to safeguard the independent relationship between
Congress and the Executive side of government. 4^
When the Naval Treaty was being negotiated, he remained
silent at his press conferences without any reason
expressed. When the Depression crisis deepened, he remained
42
silent to avoid feeding national fears. The press,
however, wanted to write about these issues. When there
was no news from the White House, the press would speculate.
When the President did have something to say, the press
would challenge him. And occasionally, when the press did
not cooperate under these conditions that the President
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. o . chastise correspondents openly for interpre-
tations however legitimate, with which he disagreed.
He reacted with anger to news accounts which criticized
him. ... He began to invite newspaper publishers to
the White House, using the occasion to complain about
correspondents whom he did not like and suggesting that
he would prefer to have them transferred. 43
In view of these conditions, it is not surprising
that for most of his presidency, Hoover's press relations
were strained, if not downright painful.
What efforts, if any, the press secretary made to
relieve the tensions between the President and the press
are not clear. Akerson protected the President's right to
personal privacy and he held that the dignity of the
Presidency precluded the kind and detail of information
that the reporters wanted. But beyond this, Akerson had
his own separate relationship with the press, with his own
strengths and weaknesses separate from those of the
President.
First the strengths. Akerson made every effort to
accommodate the photographers of the press corps, both
motion pictures and stills. The President was at best a
reluctant subject in front of the lens, but by careful
planning Akerson arranged special photography sessions with
the President. The use of movies, especially sound movies,
in news coverage was in the developing stages in 1928 but
was receiving a great deal of encouragement. Paramount




>ve 9b*/n no* . - j. , t *4. ju*i%
u* BAOX8«»a rfq X' xajfA
•
nam**: Ia*»1> « r
srirt A A **' f 1
76
early stages of promoting movie news clips to be shown at
movie houses. It was through Akerson 's offices that the
President and the photographic agents were able to reach a
mutual understanding about the nature of the filming
sessions and the use of the pictures. From the corres-
pondence between Akerson and these agents/ these working
agreements were established:
1. Filming session would not be held on any regular
basis.
2. The President would retain the right to review and
authorize the use of the photographs.
3. Sound equipment could not be used without specific
permission.
4. Motion picture agents would not use their film as
still shots.
5. Candid shots at these sessions would not be
permitted. 44
This working arrangement enjoyed some support from the
press. The Saturday Evening Post made this comment on
Akerson* s work with the photographers!
Akerson is the shepherd of the photographers. They
include the men who make the still, movie and talkie
pictures. Obviously there can be no indiscriminate
photographing of the head of a nation. Only qualified
photographers having official cards are permitted to
accompany the President or snap him in the White House
grounds.
The talkies presented a new problem. It was
impossible to permit any informal presidential remarks
to be reproduced. In consequence, the President's
speech is recorded only on important occasions. 45
Akerson made an effort to give the photographer the same
















It is George too who has the keen eye for the
camera* Although a reporter by experience and
training, he also has been a managing editor and so
knows the worth of pictures. ... So he has assidu-
ously cultivated the photographers, whether of stills,
movies or talkies and much to the pain of the writing
corps he sees to it that the camera toters are always
taken care of and fully represented. When the plan for
the remodeling of the executive offices was being laid
out, he made sure that they should have a lounging room
of their own. Heretofore they had hung around on the
public chairs in the vestibule, with their cameras
dumped anywhere. 46
Akerson did make some effort to bring equity to the
various news agents seeking recognition from the White
House. For his efforts on behalf of the business press, he
received this letter of appreciations
I would like to take advantage of this opportunity
to tell you that the business paper editors are very
grateful, indeed, to you for putting this important
portion of the press on a parity with the daily
newspapers. 47
Akerson initiated the twice-daily press conferences
by the press secretary. It was his habit to meet with the
press at 10:00 A.M. and 4s 00 P.M. daily except those days
when the President had a press conference. On those days,
the presidential press conference would be substituted for
one of Akerson 1 s conferences. There are no transcripts of
these conferences in the Akerson Papers. Nor is there any
evidence that he prepared material for these conferences.
Occasionally the President, at his own press conferences,
would make some reference to the Akerson press meetings
usually noting that additional background material or













secretary's conference. The significance of this extra
attention to the press did not go unnoticed. The American
Mercury magazine commented:
He is the originator of the twice-daily press
conference, to which the reporters come with their
queries about postmasterships and other local items.
This idea of seeing the reporters daily is plainly the
invention of one who knows his Washington correspondents
thoroughly. In offering them a chance to palaver daily
with a presidential contact, Mr. Akerson saw that not
only could a very important influence be thrown upon
the copy they produced, but that the conference could
be used as a screen behind which activities could be
carried on which might otherwise be ferreted out—that
is, if the reporters were not lulled into security.
Mr. Akerson, himself for years one of the most
accomplished of Washington correspondents, appreciated
fully the average reporters disinclination to root
into things if he can possibly avoid doing so. He knew
that if the average man of the corps could feel that he
was "protected" he would usually take what was given to
him.
So he installed his twice-daily meetings. ...
Unluckily, certain of the more independent and restless
of the boys soon grasped the fact that he passed out
only what the White House wanted known, and that much
remained to be turned up by accident long afterward. 48
Although news management was not an identifiable
phrase in the press jargon of Hoover's era, the practice of
manipulating the kind and the timing of news was recognized.
Akerson was able to time his news releases with some
success to assure the best possible coverage and treatment
for his "chief."
When the Senate, in the face of Presidential
denunciation, approved for a second time the debenture
plan, he outmaneuvered the recalcitrant chamber for the
headlines the next morning by releasing late the same
evening several letters that had come to the President
apparently fortuitously, from the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Agriculture giving their
8V
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expert opinions on the dangers of the proposition. The
press of the land, being overwhelmingly Republican,
gave the President's communications the big play—at
the expense, alas, of the far more significant news
that the Senate, despite a heavy Republican majority
and only a few months after the new Republican
President had come to office, had for a second time in
a few weeks voted no conficence.49
Another example of Akerson using this timing technique
involved upstaging the visit of former President Coolidge
to Washington. Evidently the Coolidge visit was all set
for the top space in the morning papers when
George very neatly nicked it by producing a statement
from the President that the Army was to be directed to
investigate how it could reduce its costs—an
idealistic assignment, if there ever was one. Mr.
Coolidge, much to his surprise and disgust, went into
the inside pages. 50
Akerson also devoted a good deal of his time and
effort to maintaining professional amenities with the
press. As word came to his attention that some member of
the press had been promoted, he would note the promotion
with this kind of congratulatory letter:
This is just to extend my congratulations to you
upon your appointment as Assistant to the Publisher of
the New York Evening Graphic . I am glad to know that
you are going to continue your work as a political
editor. 5 ^
Or at the occasion of the establishment of a new newspaper,
especially a Republican one, Akerson would write this kind
of lettert
I am very glad to add my word of good wishes for
the first issue of the Onondaga Republican. Nothing so
fosters the spirit of Republicanism as a newspaper
medium given over to the dissemination of information















There was evidently some necessity for the press
secretary to "police" the actions of the correspondents
while they were in the White House, But it is to
Akerson's credit that he handled these occasions with
restraint. When there was a complaint that the press did
nothing but sit in the press room and play cards , it was
Akerson who asked them to keep the door closed. When
members of the press left the press conference before the
President had finished, again it was Akerson who did the
"police" work with the minimum of offense?
Memo to Newsmen:
It is requested that no correspondents leave the
room during a conference with the President, until such
conference is at an end. There has been considerable
confusion caused by several correspondents rushing out
to telephones before the President has finished. It
occurs to me that in fairness to all correspondents who
attend the conference, no one should leave. 53
The official end of a Hoover press conference was
never clear to reporters. After the President finished his
prepared remarks, reporters might get in one or two
questions, usually about Hoover's weekend plans. The
President answered these questions occasionally. The only
sure sign that the conference had ended was Mr. Hoover's
leaving the room. Today, the press conference is over when
the senior wire service man on assignment to the White
House says, "Thank you, Mr. President." This practice
started during F.D.R. 's press conferences. A. Merriman













and the senior wire service man, explained the official
beginning and ending of the F.D.R. press conferences in his
book. Thank. Xau, tsr_. President*
The conference begins when either Harold Beckley of
the Senate press gallery, or Bill Donaldson of the
House gallery, shouts "all in" from the rear of the
room. • • •
The questioning actually closes and the meeting is
over when the senior wire service man on the White
House assignment decides that the reporters have
exhausted the news possibilities for that day and says,
"Thank you, Mr. President." 54
These were some of Akerson r s successes with the
press, but there were also some failures. When tension
came and persisted between the President and the press, it
is not clear that Akerson made any vigorous attempt to
mediate the difficulties. Did he advise the President
about the dangers of press favoritism? Did Akerson try to
bring perspective to the President about his sensitivity to
criticism and his penchant for privacy? Where was Akerson
when Hoover would try to track down his critics and have
them reprimanded? Did the press secretary try to help
accommodate the press at Rapidan? Evidently, Akerson did
not address himself to these questions. There is no
evidence to indicate that the press secretary tried to
mediate any of these problem areas. It is assumed that
Akerson supported the President's right to privacy*
Hoover's reprimanding of critical reporters, and the condi-
tions at the Rapidan camp.
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Akerson's relations with the press was his attempts to
placate instead of mediate the problems between the press
and the President. When the President was distant and non-
communicative, Akerson tried to be friendly and informa-
tive. But it didn't work. The friendly press secretary
just could not compensate for the aloof President. Some
press opinion regarded Akerson's friendliness as overbearing
and his information as unreliable. Words like "political
valet" and "back slapper" began to appear in print and turn
the tone of press opinion against Akerson. His credibility
began to wane as mistakes were made.
Akerson occasionally got his "facts" a little
muddled as on the day when he nodded his head wisely
and confidently in the affirmative when asked at 4
o'clock if Justice Harlan F. Stone was to be appointed
Chief Justice, at 4:30 followed it with confirmation in
the form of a statement naming Charles Evans Hughes. 55
The paucity of news from the President was bad
enough, but press relations were strained even further when
the available news was garbled by the press secretary.
The very heart of Akerson's job was to bring about
good relations between the President and the press but good
press relations were disintegrating by 1930. How much of
this disintegration resulted from Akerson's overbearing
personality, his political methods, and his loss of
credibility is difficult to determine. These elements were
present along with a strong-minded President who created
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ineptitudes of the press secretary or the strong-minded
convictions of the President is risky. The following press
comment tried to put the two in perspectives
He /Akerson/ is, by God's will, a jovial,
expansive fellow who finds it hard to say no. As a
result he sometimes promises more than he can fulfill.
It is not his fault. That is exactly what Mr. Hoover
has him there for. But to the victims that is small
consolation, with the result that George is often
accused of a double-dealing for which he is only
indirectly responsible. At the Williamstown Institute
last Summer, it was widely related that he was to blame
for a "cordon of duplicity " that was alleged to
surround the White House. That was not altogether fair
to him. He is undoubtedly the visible evidence of the
cordon, but like the Marines in Haiti, he is merely
doing the best he can in a not very salubrious job. 57
Press opinion of Akerson never reached the
extremes of laudatory praise and critical reprisals that
were heaped on Hoover. The press usually viewed Akerson as
a well-intentioned man who worked for a difficult boss.
Press comment on Akerson followed closely the political
inclinations of the publication. The pro-Hoover and the
anti-Hoover press described Akerson in accordance with
their Hoover predispositions. The Saturday Evening Pjasi., a
long-time Hoover supporter, described the press secretary
as ". . . the best known of the secretaries, since he is
the direct link between the public and the President.
Every letter asking for an appointment with the Chief
Executive passes across his desk. Every visitor who sees
the President in his office must arrange the appointment
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is better qualified, for he has run the range from reporter
to assistant managing editor—he disseminates the White
58House news every day at 10 o , clock and 4 o'clock."
The American Mercury magazine, a consistent Hoover
critic, made this comment on Akerson in December of 1929*
It is not every Norsky farm-boy who becomes a
presidential secretary even one of four and rides about
in a White House car. He has, in fact, a weakness for
automobiles. Before he came to the White House, he
liked to roll up to the houses of his friends in a taxi
and keep it waiting for hours while he prolonged his
call. 59
When Akerson left the White House, the New York Evening
Post made this appraisals
He has been so to speak, "first secretary " to the
President ranking Mr. Richey and Mr. Newton. In this
position he has contributed much to the human contact
which the White House has signally needed. He has made
excellent and efficient relations with the press. ...
For the sake of the administration, we regret to see
Mr. Akerson resign his office. 60
The Press Conferences
The White House press conferences dramatize most
vividly the struggle between Hoover and the press, a
struggle made all the more dramatic because the press
conference idea held such hope for improved reporter-
President communication. The President expressed this hope
in his first press conference, held March 5, 1929, two days
after inauguration. He discussed his plans for future
meetingss
I wish yaur cooperation on further development of
these /pres,a/ conferences. As you know, the relations
of the President and the press have been a matter of
•taxaee
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development over a number of administrations. ... By
degrees, a means has been found for a more intimate
relationship, and I hope an impression that we might
develop it even further in those directions which would
assist the press and the President. ... I wish to be
of such service as I can in these conferences, and
beyond this in matters of special character that are
not of general interest. I would be glad to see any of
you from time to time. I want you to feel free to make
such suggestions as will help me out in that
direction. 61
The spirit of these remarks indicated that the President
would not only continue the press conference practices of
past administrations, but was willing to improve and expand
the meetings he had with the press.
The first formal White House press conference was
62held by Woodrow Wilson on March 15, 1913. Although
Wilson discontinued the press conferences as America
entered World War I, his successor, Warren Harding
(publisher of the Marion £JL2jC* an Ohio newspaper) , restored
the regular White House press conference. Harding's
meetings with the press were frequent, regular, and
informal, but a tacit understanding of press conduct
existed between the President and the press. Basically,
the press agreed to keep the President's confidences when
he spoke "off the record" and not to quote the President
63directly without his permission.
Coolidge retained the press conference procedures
established by Harding but the informality between the
President and the press was gone and replaced by some rigid
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of the conferences. Because Coolidge rarely spoke for
quotation, ghostly anonymity was established.
When Herbert Hoover inherited this press conference
institution, it was young, pliable, and filled with
potential. Here was a remarkable communications opportun-
ity. The increasingly important development of American
and world opinion could be addressed directly,
Hoover's intention was to build upon the press
conference practices that previous Presidents had provided.
Rules and regulations would be established, set down in
writing , made public, and adhered to. At his first press
conference, Hoover set in motion the machinery which would
bring recognized organization to the press conference
institution!
I would like to suggest that Mr. Young, who is
President of the White House Press Association, make up
a committee of the heads of bureaus and services to
discuss the matter with me. I am anxious to clear up
the twilight zone as far as we can between authorita-
tive and quotable material on one hand, and such
material as I am able to give from time to time for
purely background purposes on the other. 64
At the President's next press conference, on March 8, he
was able to report to all the correspondents that some
press arrangements had been agreed upon. Specifically, Mr.
Young, his committee, and Akerson had identified and
defined three categories of press conference information.
These three categories of information have been reprinted
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announced, but the President originally worded them as
follows:
The first category—those that I will endeavor to
answer for you for quotation/ or in some cases . . .
secure for you a complete answer from the responsible
official, which can be used. And I will endeavor to
cover as many of the important public questions as
possible.
The second category—questions which are on matters
of secondary interest on which the President does not
like to be scattered all over the newspapers in
discussing minor and secondary questions; and in the
replies to these the view of your committee and myself
was that they could be attributed as from the White
House or the administration, but I think you will agree
with me that it is not desirable for me to comment on
everything in the world, and that if I were put in that
position I would have to be somewhat reticent, whereas
under that sort of heading I will be able to give you
a* much material as possible.
The third category--purely background questions
that are more or less factual on things on which you
don't want any authority attributed, and you don't have
to use it if you don't want it. 65
On the evening of the March 8 press conference, the
White House Correspondents Association Committee of nine
newsmen and George Akerson drew up guidelines for the
66
operation of the press conferences. The results of this
meeting were issued in a memorandum dated March 9, 1929.
It is assumed that the members of the White House
Correspondents Association and appropriate members of the
President's staff received copies of this memo. The memo
contained six policy statements. In brief, they were:
1. The White House will issue admission tickets to the
press conferences but the White House Correspondents
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2. All questions should be submitted in writing 24
hours in advance of the conference* except such
questions as arise out of the incident of the day.
3. As appropriate, the questions will be answered in
writing and may be reproduced by direct quotation
either of the President or such persons as may
prepare the written answer.
4. Some questions will be answered verbally at the
conference # and are not to be reproduced by
quotation, but may be attributed to the authority
of the White House or the administration.
Transcripts of the verbal statements will be held
by Mr. Akerson and may be referred to by corres-
pondents for details.
5. Background questions will be answered by the
President purely for the information of the corres-
pondents. This material, if used, must not be
attributed in any manner but is used solely on the
responsibility of the reporter.
6. No reference is to be made to questions submitted
to which no replies are made. 67
Admission and membership rules were further defined
by this press committee and Akerson. Applications for
admission had to be made to Akerson with the approval of
the appropriate committee of the Correspondents Associa-
tion. The details of this administration procedure are
spelled out in an untitled and unsigned statement dated
May 28, 1929. These are the main points of this statements
1. Applicant must declare that he is not engaged in
any conflict of interest activity, i.e., employed
by U.S. or foreign government, the stock exchange,
a brokerage house, or a corporation having legis-
lation pending before Congress, etc.
2. Admission is confined to representatives of news-
papers or press agencies requiring daily
telegraphic press service, and to news-collecting
agencies which furnish a daily news service to the
-» V »j D , M . 1o
srtt :to \ii XW 8
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Washington representatives of newspapers and press
associations for telegraphing to daily newspapers;
and to such trade newspapers, not necessarily
published daily, which are authenticated by the
appropriate committee of management of the White
House Correspondents Association.
3. Applicant must agree in writing to abide by such
rules and restrictions as the President may deem
necessary.
4. Representatives of an editorial staff may be
temporarily admitted at the discretion of the
appropriate committee of management of the White
House Correspondents Association with the approval
of the White House.
5. Those admitted to the press conferences on a
regular basis shall be regarded as members of the
White House Correspondents Association and shall
elect annually a committee charged with the
administration and enforcement of the rules
governing the press conferences subject to the
approval of the press secretary acting for the
President.
6. The President alone shall exercise disciplinary
measures. 68
By May of 1929, Akerson and the committee had
detailed written guidelines for the administration of the
press conferences that were mutually acceptable to the
President and the press.
The ground rules had been laid; the starting point
determined. Akerson* s job now was to help both the press
and the President work within these guidelines.
The two areas that required most of Akerson 's
efforts were admission to the press conferences and the
question categories. Both areas generated contention.
Akerson worked closely with the officers of the White House
Press Association and with the President to resolve the
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conflicts.
Once it was made public that the President had
established the press conferences on a twice-weekly basis
/
Akerson received many requests for admission, some from
visiting reporters, students, and home-town politicians.
Everyone felt he had a bona fide reason to be admitted.
But under the admission rules, most of these requests had
to be denied. Those who were refused admittance were
dissatisfied and appealed to Akerson. For example, the
Washington correspondent for the New Jersey paily Record *
William J. Boyd, asked Akerson to intervene with the
69
membership committee on his behalf. Akerson *s reply was
typical of his answer to those kinds of requests
3
It is impossible under the rules of the White House
Correspondents Association and the arrangements which I
have made with the officers of that Association to
grant you the privileges of the presidential press
conferences.
I have no objection to your coming to see me any
time that you have a particular query, but you will
understand that the number of correspondents must be
limited to those who are on full time of their news-
papers. 70
The only instances where Akerson deviated from this
kind of reply involve requests from foreign newsmen to
interview the President. Instead of arranging for an
interview, Akerson would arrange for the White House
Correspondents Association to admit the foreign corres-
71pondent to the press conferences on a temporary basis.
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the Membership Committee, Paul Woontori/ Washington
correspondent for the Times-Picayune and McGraw-Hill/ on
this problem. There were times when Mr. Woonton, rather
than Akerson, would directly answer the dissatisfied party.
But in either case, both the press secretary and the
chairman implemented the rules with the same kind of reply.
When the UPA charged that the representatives of the
business press had been discriminated against, Mr. Woonton
replied:
I have it on direct authority that Mr. George
Akerson, secretary to the President, who is in charge
of press relations, has accorded business papers
exactly the same rights he has accorded the daily
papers. In each instance he is working through a
committee of correspondents. The executive committee
of the White House Correspondents Association passes
upon the applications from daily newspapers and the
Business Paper Correspondents Committee passes upon the
applications from the business papers.
We should appreciate a correction being released
through your organization to the same papers which
received the original story. 7 2
While those members of the press not admitted to
the press conferences expressed discontent, generally
Akerson was able to support the admissions policy to the
satisfaction of the White House Correspondents Association.
Akerson 1 s support of the second policy difficulty,
the three categories of information, was exercised mainly
with the President. As the press conferences progressed
through March, some clarification of these information
categories had to be made. The clarifications were made by
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the President during the press conferences. In both the
examples cited here, the wording was prepared in rough form
73by Akerson and initialed by the President. At his
March 12/ 1929/ press conference. Hoover made this
clarification on the information for quotation category:
I have this request to make of you. No one in this
position wishes to be put in the attitude of constant
pronunciamentos on public questions. This has been one
of the difficulties in handling the twilight zone that
we have discussed before, and I am giving you these
answers, which we will have transcribed for you with
the understanding that you will quote this little
opening:
"In reply to a question from the representatives of
the press the President stated today: "74
At the March 28, 1929, press conference, the
President reiterated the policy of submitting questions at
least twenty-four hours in advance:
Written questions, so far as possible, should be
put in 24 hours in advance on subjects that are not
critical at the moment, and the questions submitted
immediately before the conference be confined to
matters which have arisen on the crest of the day's
events. It gives me an opportunity for a considered
answer, and will enable me to give you more informa-
tion. I think that would facilitate the volumn of
information which can be given. 75
Even with the clarifications made by the President
at various press conferences, there were still clarifica-
tions to be made by Akerson. These clarifications were
made in letters dated throughout 1929 and 1930, similar to
the one Akerson wrote to the News Manager of the United
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I thought that everyone understood the rule,
namely, that when the President is to be quoted
directly a complete transcript of his remarks is given
out at the White House* This has been done ever since
Mr. Hoover took office. He can not be quoted except
indirectly unless permission is given. There have been
one or two violations of this, but it has been called
to the attention of the correspondents who violated the
rule.
If you have been following what we are doing here
you will know that all quotations of the President are
mimeographed for the use of the newspapers and they
oftentimes include not only a few sentences, but many
paragraphs. 7 6
Although both Akerson and the President worked to
bring clarity to the three information categories, the
system never worked to anyone - s satisfaction. There is
more to suggest that this system did more to inhibit rather
than aid the flow of information between the President and
the press. A closer look at how this questioning practice
worked reveals some serious weaknesses. Correspondents
submitted questions to Akerson, who in turn submitted them
to the President for his selection. The President himself
would also initiate subjects for the press conferences.
The questions were submitted informally, some typed, some
handwritten; some on formal stationary, most on pad paper.
All were signed. Some bore the handwritten instructions of
the President to Akerson. Those that were chosen for a
direct quotable answer were given by the President to
Akerson to prepare the rough draft. The drafts were then
reviewed by Hoover, corrections were made, and Akerson 'a
office duplicated the answers so that copies would be
7.-1i*7 8<
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available at the press conferences. The presidential press
files contain the reporters* questions* Akerson's drafts*
the final handout* and the transcripts of the press
77
conferences.
Submitting written questions in advance created
some difficult problems for the press. Under the agreed
upon rules* the President could choose which questions were
to be answered and when. Hoover could ignore some* table
others* or confine his answers to "off the record" back-
ground statements. The reporters had agreed to a system
that ignored their news values and news deadlines. A
timely story had to wait on the inclination of the
President. The disparity between what was asked and what
was answered showed up early in the press conferences and
contributed to some discontentment among the White House
correspondents. This disparity is demonstrated in a count
of the questions and answers of the first three months
s
1929 Reporters • Direct Quotation Background
Month Questions Information Information
«"*a*MMwa» "n..|i———
«
im———I » m» n i i ii in 1 -| i i i i ill ii in i . j*».iwwiini—i»a* nmm —-
March 44 16 5
April 20 7 5
May 4 10
During the month of April* with twenty-eight
questions not answered from March and twenty questions
submitted in April* the President made only seven state-
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of appointments. Additionally, Hoover opened each press
conference in April with a remark that must have signaled
reporters that there would not be a story to file from the
forthcoming press conference. These are Hoover's opening
statements for the month of April 1929:
April 9. I am afraid that this is going to be a famine
morning.
12. There is a partial famine today. All the
notes that I have on questions are really for
background, nothing for direct quotation.
16. Well, I'm afraid this is a famine day.
19. Only one announcement today.
23. This is a famine day.
26. This is a famine day again.
Less than one month after the press had been encouraged
that at last there would be open and meaningful communica-
tion between reporters and the President, six press
conferences produce only a minimum of quotable material and
what was given was of a routine nature. The President's
remarks at the April 30 press conference indicate that the
reporters had already lost confidence in the written
question system*
I haven't a single question from the Press this
morning. Apparently you have no curiosity whatever.
But I think you will have to take a part of this labor
upon yourselves and indicate some directions in which
you would like a little information. A press confer-
ence is a conference that works both ways, and I do not
know that I can stand up here and deliver orations and
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This remark could not have helped the situation. The
reporters were yetting very little feedback on their ques-
tions and since all of them had to be written* the success
of the press conference as a channel of communications was
in trouble after less than two months. The situation never
bettered itself. During Akerson's two years as press
secretary* it is only in the month of November 1929 that
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Not only do these figures suggest a serious
weakness in the written question system but further
evidence shows that very few reporters asked questions. A
tally of the questions was made, adding up the number asked
by each reporter. This tally shows 112 questions submitted
from the press in 1929 and 59 submitted in 1930# for a
Included information initiated by Hoover as well
as responses to reporters* questions.
M
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total of 171, Of the 33 regular White House correspondents,
four reporters accounted for 94 of these 171 questions.
W. P. Flythe of Universal Service asked 14; George Durno of
International News asked 21; Paul Woonton of the Times-
Picayune and McGraw-Hill asked 32; and Lawrence Sullivan of
the Baltimore Post asked 37.
The President's reluctance to answer some questions
and his practice of deferring the answers to others led to
apathy among the reporters. Neither the press nor the
President were fully participating in the press conference,
Hoover realized this and made this request at the
September 13, 1929, press conference
:
I wonder sometimes whether when we have a thin day
it is worth your while to come—whether we could not
hand your questions over to Mr. Akerson, or whether you
prefer to come. If you would rather have the open
session I am agreeable, but I always feel that I am not
assisting you as much as I should like when we have a
thin day like this.
The Press i I think, Mr. President, we prefer the open
session. 8^
The press meant to hold the President to his word about
meeting with them twice a week. The President's recourse
was to submit to the letter if not the spirit of his agree-
ment. This led to some abrupt and bitter press
conferences. The press conference of November 7, 1930, is
presented here in the complete transcription. It shows how
useless these meetings were for the accomplishment of
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resentment of reporters:
The President s I have a number of inquiries from you
gentlemen upon contentious questions, but the job for
the country to concentrate on now is further measures
of cooperation for economic recovery.
And that is the only suggestion I have for you on
this occasion, Q l
within a month of his inauguration, Hoover had
voiced a willingness to be informative with the press and
had authorized the necessary organization to facilitate the
exchange of information. However, he chose not to use the
press conferences as a channel of communications to the
people. Hoover wanted the press to report the actions of
his administration and not the words, particularly his
words, He made this very clear to the reporters in his
November 12, 1929, press conference. His specific reference
here is the stock market crash.
We are dealing here with a psychological situation
to a very considerable degree. It is a question of
fear. ... it seriously concerns the press to give the
confidence to the public that the business fabric is
now organizing itself, taking steps on its own respons-
ibility to carry on. So that I am trying to get this
problem across by action in different industries and
other groups rather than by too much talking, and
therefore I don't want to talk about it, I want the
action to speak for itself. &*
Perhaps some of this skepticism toward words can be traced
to his October 25, 1929, press conference. The day after
"Black Thursday w the President made the following statement
for quotation? it was widely published and yet the market
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restored. The entire transcript is presented here, noting
that this was the last detailed information to come from
the President on the business situation until he made the
"action rather than words" statement on the 12th of
November.
All the questions I have today—or most of them—
are on the business situation.
The fundamental business of the country/ that is,
the production and distribution of commodities, is on a
very sound and prosperous basis. The best evidence is
that although production and consumption are at a very
high level, the average prices of these commodities,
taken as a whole, have shown no increase in the whole
of the last twelve months, and there has been no
appreciable increase in the stock of manufactured
goods. Therefore, there has been no speculation in
commodities. There has been a tendency for wage
increases and the output per worker has increased, all
of which indicates a very healthy situation.
The construction and building material industries
have been somewhat affected by the high interest rates
induced by the New York speculation, and there has been
some seasonal decrease in two or three other industries,
but these movements are of secondary character when
they are considered in the light of the whole
situation.
The temporary drop in grain prices sympathetic with
stock exchange prices usually happens, but, as the
Department of Agriculture points out, the overriding
fact in grain is that this year's world wheat harvest
is 500 million bushels below last year, and will result
in a very low carry-over at the end of the harvest
year.
And that is all I have today.
Press a Is that for quotation?
2he_ President t Yes, it is for quotation. 83
In the press conferences between October 25 and November 12,
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there were questions from the press. Hoover would only talk
"off the record" about the business situation.* He made
this clear at the November 5 press conferences
I see no particular reason for making any public
statements about it, either directly or indirect ly.&4
After October 25, Hoover created a vacuum of information
about the business situation. Although he explained why he
did not wish to speak on the subject at the November 12,
1929, press conference, speculation continued. The
President evidently was not satisfied that the reporters
were in complete cooperation with him. At the November 29
press conference, he made this suggestion to themt
There is a purely personal note that I wanted to
sound with you about this business situation—not for
publication.
The handling of public psychology of this kind is a
little difficult. If we overdo our job we may create a
sense that the situation is more serious than it really
is. There is always a very difficult point of balance,
and I only wanted to make a minor suggestion to you,
and that is that hereafter if you could confine your-*
selves merely to the statement of the things that
actually happen; ... And I am anxious that our form
of news be not so much any exaggerated statement of the
items as it is a definite statement of accomplishment
without overdoing the situation. There is a delicate
balance in it, but I will leavs. t&at to you. We
probably won't arrive either /sifi/ 100%, but we will
get somewhere with it.
I am making thai: suggestion to you. It is not my
intention to lecture the press on what they should do,
but you have shown a cooperative spirit in this problem
of nation-wide importance, and I merely make this sug-
gestion on the form of news. It is not censorship. 8 *
But even on issues that did not involve the
psychology of national fear. Hoover did not use the press
"Off the record" was not an information category
identified by Hoover. He used it when he spoke for
reporters' ears only.
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conference as a channel of communication. The reduction in
armaments through the London Naval Treaty was an issue that
greatly interested the press, one that was often the
subject of their written questions. Hoover never spoke in
detail "on the record" about arms limitation and his "off
the record" comments were limited. Nor did he approve of
the propaganda that had been sponsored by the shipbuilding
corporations adverse to the Naval Disarmament Conference.
The shipbuilders were opposed to any Naval Treaty that
would limit ship construction. To gain support for their
position, they organized a publicity campaign against the
United States signing any Naval treaty that would limit
ship construction. Hoover commented on this kind of
publicity in his September 6, 1929, press conferences
Every American has the right to express his opinion
and to engage in open propaganda if he wishes, but it
is obviously against public interest for those who have
financial interest in, or may be engaged in contracts
for the construction of naval vessels to secretly
attempt to influence public opinion or public officials
by propaganda in favor of larger armaments and attempt
to defeat the efforts of the government in world
limitation of such armaments or to employ persons for
such purposes. I am making this statement publicly so
that there can be no misapprehension of my determination
that our present international negotiations shall not
be interfered with from such sources and through such
methods. 86
Mostly, he did not refer to the armament questions asked,
but when he did, he made no reply, such as his March 29,
1930, press conference!
I have one question on instructions to Limitation
of Arms Conference. There is no use getting out your
paper since I am unable to make any announcement.**?
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While policy was being formulated, Hoover, like most
government officials, wanted to work in privacy. But once
agreement had been reached, he expected full coverage.
When Hoover did sign the Naval Treaty on July 22, 1930, he
announced the signing with a long, prepared quotation for
publication, the first of its kind on this subject for
about eighteen months. After Hoover read the statement, a
reporter asked, "Why the special attention, Mr. President?
"
The President answered, "I just thought you might get some
satisfaction out of it."
Did Akerson support this minimal use of the press
conference as a channel of communication? The record is
not clear. In the collection of rough drafts, there is no
evidence that Akerson prepared quotable information of the
kind and number that the press requested but was overruled
by the President. The corrections of these rough drafts
made by the President usually involved language changes
rather than any changes in substance. In a letter to this
writer from Akerson 1 s son, George Akerson, Jr., publisher
of the Boston Herald-Traveler, he notes that his father
held a conflicting opinion with Secretary Richey about the
39press conferences. As the Depression deepened, Richey
felt that the President should discontinue meeting the
press; Akerson disagreed. While Akerson was press secre-
tary, the President met the press twice a week even if it
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Some correspondents charged that the press
conference failure was Akerson's responsibility. They
claimed they submitted fifty to sixty questions for each
press conference, but Akerson was eliminating all questions
90he regarded as "silly" or beneath presidential notice.
The answer to this charge is not in the record. If
Akerson did select and reject the questions, then those
that did not reach the President's attention must have been
discarded. But the 171 questions in the file bear
evidence that the President at least read them. In any
case, Akerson* s part in the processing of these questions
was held suspect by the press.
Although Hoover never missed a scheduled press
conference during 1929 and 1930, neither he nor his press
secretary could have taken much satisfaction in the results
of these meetings they had so carefully planned. The
conferences were formal affairs. Reporters were allowed to
ask only a minimal number of clarification questions.
Reporters came to believe that the President concealed more
91
at these conferences than he revealed.
As with so many aspects of the Hoover Presidency,
the press conferences started with optimism and ended with
despair. Press comment in March of 1929, after the new
rules had been published, was optimistic. By the end of
1929, this optimism had turned to despair. In December of






described the difference between the promises and the
reality:
The great expectations of journalistic reforms
which Mr. Hoover aroused last spring have not been
realized .... The correspondents must accept
administration viewpoints or go without , as secrecy
surrounds all departmental dealings. ^2
Washington correspondent Harold Brayman made this comment
in September of 1930:
Mr. Hoover's treatment of written inquiries is so
pronounced that most correspondents no longer take the
trouble to write them out.^J
Even the press conferences held twice a day by
Akerson came within this press criticism:
Here again* the reporters soon discovered that the
system was being used chiefly to beguile and lull them.
They found that either deliberately or because he did
not know and was trying to cover up the facts, the
secretary repeatedly misled them on important details;
as a result of this slick policy these daily confer-
ences soon fell into disrepute. 94
After two years of regular press conferences, there
was general disillusionment between the President and the
White House correspondents. Two comments by Paul Anderson,
who covered Washington for The Mation , illustrate the
complete reversal of the White House correspondents after
one year's association with the President. On March 3,
1929, Anderson reported:
Hoover, already a hero, promises to become a saint
before his administration is a month old. I am happy
to report that Hoover's attitude is much more sensible
than that of his devotees ... he has drastically
liberalized and broadened the relationships between the
President and the press. Prom every standpoint of
frankness, honesty and practicality, the new system is
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In April 1930, Anderson reported:
It is my sad duty to report that the working of
this plan has steadily been narrowed and restricted
until now less reliable and printable information comes
from the White House than at any time while Coolidge
was President. Written questions have been so
consistently ignored that few reporters any longer
trouble to submit them. The direct quotation phase has
degenerated into a system of Presidential "handouts"
palpably propagandistic in character and seldom
responsive to inquiry. . . . 96
The press conferences continued after Akerson left
the White House, but by the end of 1930 they had failed to
provide a meaningful channel of communication. The impact
of this failure needs to be considered.
The antagonism of the Washington correspondents was
considered a contributing factor to Hoover's defeat in
1932. During the first two years of his administration,
these reporters had regular contact with the President.
Whatever Hoover's real personality and abilities were, at
his press conferences he was remote, sensitive, secretive,
and displayed an acute fear of criticism. The corres-
pondents found nothing interesting, magnetic, or appealing
in his personality, and that lack was inevitably reflected
in their treatment of him.
Hoover's friends maintained that the day-by-day
dispatches of the Washington correspondents did as much
to defeat him in 1932 as did Charles Michelson and the
Democratic Party. The photographers joined the con-
flict and many of the unflattering pictures of Mr.
Hoover can be traced more directly to bitter feelings
than to bad light. 97
The impact of this treatment may have been signif-
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in determining the editorial policy of the newspapers the
correspondents represented. Even in 1932, the nadir of the
Hoover administration/ fifty-five to sixty per cent of the
93
country's newspapers supported Hoover,
By the end of Hoover's first year in office, when
the reporters were already registering their complaints,
even as the events of the Depression were forming, the
President retained the great proportion of editorial
support. Even a traditionally Democratic paper like the
New York World retained some editorial support for the
President as shown in this year-end review published
March 2, 1930
1
The most impressively hopeful aspect is the revival
in Washington of the quality of large-mindedness in the
direction of affairs. Mr. Hoover, whether he succeeds
or whether he fails on the immediate issues, is in the
line of the great Presidents. After 8 years of
provincialism, there is a man in the White House who
thinks nationally. ...
His conduct after the panic in the conference to
stabilize business was really an amazing performance.
It revealed an acquaintance with the key minds of
American industry, an understanding of the nature of
the crisis, a courage to conceive and to act which may
have been decisive in averting what might have been a
national disaster. In one sense, it is never possible
to say exactly how much a man has succeeded in
preventing what might have been.
Evidence of Hoover's editorial support was
presented to the President in this tabulation of editorial
opinion concerning his first year in office. The summary
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99
opinion made by the research secretary* French Strother.
Summary of Editorial Opinion
Number of
Comment Newspapers
Too short a time to judge results 133
Accomplishments listed and praised 114
President retains public confidence 126
Papers approve fact finding 66
Papers praising appointments 25
Bad luck plagued the President 43
Accomplishments disappointingly few 70
President lacks quality of leadership 66
Praise for his administrative ability 111
Blames Senate for lack of results 123
President is not a politician 74
Predict successful administration 47
Pessimistic of future 20
Hoover's second year in office ended with
increasing criticism against him in the press. This
criticism was not so much tied to the disillusion of
reporters as the way in which Hoover dealt with prohibition
and the tariff. While Hoover was generally receiving
editorial praise during that year for his handling of the
business crisis/ he was coming into strong criticism on
prohibition and the tariff.
A Literary Digest poll in May 1930 reported that
sixty per cent of the country was wet. Hoover was a
well-established "dry." The New York World reported on
June 5, 1930, the polls indicated such divergent groups as
farmers and Wall Streeters favored veto of the Tariff Bill,
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opposition from the press and professional economists. The
only chance for saving the President ' s loss of some
editorial support in 1930 would be a sharp upturn in the
employment situation, which did not materialize. In a
compilation of Hoover press clippings for 1930/ Clair
Nelson reported in his Ph.D. thesis, "The Image of Herbert
Hoover in the American Press, " that:
There can be little doubt that the President's
disposition of the tariff and his Hdry M position on
prohibition dealt the first really serious blow to the
favorable image of Hoover. 102
Generally speaking, the failure of the press
conferences did not greatly upset the balance of editorial
support given to Hoover. The editorial support that did
wane from the administration probably did so as the result
of Hoover's stand on issues and events rather than on the
trials and tribulations of the reporters at the White
House
.
Did the failure of the press conferences result in
Akerson's resignation? There is not a clear answer to this
question. On January 2, 1931, the President announced
Akerson's intention to resign, with this statement to the
press:
The only news item I have at the moment is that Mr.
Akerson is leaving the White House service. Someone
has offered him two or three times the pay the govern-
ment can afford, and he has responsibilities to his
family that I cannot deny. I do greatly regret to lose
an old friend out of my personal service. 1Q 3
On February 5, 1931, Akerson tendered his formal
resignation to the President in this letter:
r
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It is impossible for me adequately to express to
you my deep gratitude which fills my heart for the
opportunity for service which has been given to me by
you during the past few years. While I leave the White
House officially/ I pledge you all my energies and
efforts unofficially, in furtherance of the great work
which the American people have called upon you to do.
I am always, as well, at your personal service. I do
want you to know of my profound appreciation for all
that you have done for me, and for the fine friendship
which is ours.l04
These two statements indicate that Akerson left his
post for financial reasons and that he retained the
President's respect and friendship. There is evidence to
suggest that this was in fact the case and neither the
President nor the press secretary was putting on a show.
That Akerson was in serious financial difficulties
is well established in the Akerson papers. There are a
number of bad debt letters dated throughout 1930 as well as
many attempts on Akerson* s part to borrow money. As a last
resort in late 1930, he borrowed on his life insurance.
The best testimony to the fact that the President
retained confidence in Akerson* s abilities was Hoover's
request in the spring of 1932 that Akerson take a leave of
absence from Paramount to help with the campaign. This
Akerson did.
After the defeat of the 1932 campaign, Akerson 's
fortunes slipped. Paramount went bankrupt in 1933 and
Akerson started a long period of unemployment, which
concerned Hoover a great deal. The ex-President made this
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I was greatly distressed to learn of your diffi-
culties. As you probably know, I am very much reduced
in income and have not so far been able to pay my own
way. I am, however, asking Edgar Rickard to supply you
with $125.00 a month for the present as some help and I
hope it will be helpful.
I do hope that some opening will turn up that will
relieve both the mind of yourself and Mrs. Akerson. I
am writing to some of our friends urging them to exert
themselves— for your fine abilities ought to fit in
somewhere. 105
While the President did remain a faithful friend
and did demonstrate his confidence in Akerson by asking for
Akerson* s help in the 1932 campaign, there was at least one
indication in the Presidential Papers that Hoover had
reasons for wanting a new press secretary. The diary of
James A. MacLafferty, a personal friend to President
Hoover, carries this entry for November 18, 1930s
Z called on the President today and told him
concerning the belligerent attitude of many congressmen
toward one of his secretaries, Mr. Akerson. I told him
there were, rightly or wrongly, Republican members on
the hill who had sworn they would not again come to the
White House unless the President sent for them.
I remembered as I spoke to him /Hoovex/ that months
ago he had told me he was going to make a change.
Indeed he had told me he intended to do so.
I was therefore a little surprised when the
President defended Mr. Akerson by citing the difficul-
ties of his job. He went ahead to state that for many
years no secretary had stayed with him for more than 18
months. He took from his drawer a record of a typical
day. It was a long sheet and had about twenty to
thirty lines, each line a record of an appointment he
had kept that day. The President explained that
Akerson must protect him.
I agreed that Akerson had a most difficult job, but
I said again that Akerson is driving your friends away
from you. I have done what I felt was my duty. 1^6
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A series of coincidences probably were responsible
for Akerson's resignation in January of 1931. Akerson
needed money; he was offered a job that tripled his press
secretary salary/ and the President was ready to abandon
the press conference policies he had agreed to in March of
1929. Perhaps the appointment of a new press secretary
would enable the President to reprieve himself from the
twice-weekly press conference promise and salvage a
deteriorating situation. Theodore Joslin, Washington
correspondent for the Boston Evening Transcript , was
appointed to succeed Akerson. Joslin remained as press
secretary during Hoover's final two years in office. These
two years showed a marked decrease in the number of press
107
conferences: fifteen in 1931 and twelve in 1932.
While Hoover helped to strengthen the permanency of
the press conference institution by formalizing the
practices and procedures and by meeting on a regular basis
during 1929 and 1930, he was not able to activate the
institution as a working channel of communications. Hoover
did not look upon the press conferences as an opportunity
to communicate to the press and through them to the public.
The judgment of the press was that the press conference
arrangements worked out to conceal rather than reveal
information. Neither the President nor Akerson's successor
could revive the correspondents' confidence in the useful-
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George Akerson did not come to the White House on
the crest of a distinguished career nor did he leave the
President's service in a rising tide of expectation. The
traces of his efforts on the historical record are few and
faint. He was a man of average ability whose ambition/
hard work/ and luck brought him very close to a President.
His contributions to the Hoover administration were
significant not because he was able to control or influence
the events of his day, for this he clearly did not do # but
rather/ because he was an innovator. As the first
Presidential Press Secretary, he was the first man to give
his full-time attention to the President's press relations.
Akerson had to initiate the duties and dimensions of his
job. While most of his innovations failed/ his attempts
are significant.
In Chapter I, four aspects of a press secretary's
duties were summarized. This summary will be used as a
guide to these concluding remarks.
The press secretary is expected tot
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2. Prepare policy recommendations in the field of
information.
3. Facilitate the work of the President and the press
with the President having his ultimate priority.
4. Represent the President and the press to each
other.
Using this guide, the first question is did
Akerson, as the President's spokesman* keep the public
informed? Akerson made significant innovations in this
area. He held his own twice-daily press briefings; he
organized and planned the twice-weekly presidential press
conferences; he brought news photographers into the White
House on an equal parity with reporters. Akerson
established the communications channels needed to keep the
public informed. The President, however, was reluctant to
use the press conferences or his press secretary as a
channel of communications. When not used, these channels
lose their ability to serve the communications function.
The final result was that little information about the
President reached the public.
Douglass Cater wrote that the press secretary is
the "hourly spokesman for the President." Akerson
certainly was not Hoover's "hourly spokesman." Along with
the other members of the White House secretariat, Akerson
met with the President at 9»00 a.m. each day, but Akerson
did not have immediate "walk-in" privileges to the
President's office. Akerson held his daily meetings with
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the press at IOjOO a.m. and 4:00 p.m. each day. These
meetings usually involved minor announcements and routine
information. Akerson's press conferences were held in low
regard by the reporters who realized that the press
secretary did not have full access to the President.
Reporters claimed that the content of Akerson's press
meetings was either trivial, evasive, or erroneous. Since
Akerson did not enjoy Hoover's full confidence, the press
secretary had little credibility as the President's
spokesman.
The second role for a press secretary is the
preparation of policy recommendations in the field of
information. The policy recommendations that determined
the operation of the presidential press conferences were
clearly prepared by Akerson. It was Akerson who formulated
the details of the press conference policies with the White
House Correspondents Association and obtained Hoover's
approval. Akerson also prepared the policy recommendations
that determined the rules and practices required in the
photography sessions with the President. Akerson's
correspondence suggests that the press secretary had
participated in policy decisions concerning speech release
dates, the President's public appearances, his membership
in clubs and organizations, his acceptance of gifts and
honors, and a variety of activities that involved the
President with the citizenry.
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Akerson's participation in information policy
matters did not include all aspects of communications. In
matters concerning book and magazine publication, French
Strother suggested the policy and carried out the
President's will. In matters concerning publishers, the
President himself made the decisions.
There is no evidence to suggest that Akerson
participated in the major policy-making decisions of the
Hoover administration. His counsel on the events of the
Depression, prohibition/ armaments, and tariff was
evidently never considered. Akerson's opportunities to
make policy recommendations to his chief were very limited.
Cutlip and Center describe the significance of a public
relations man limited in this way to the mechanics of
publicity:
All too often he cools his heels in the outer
office while a major policy decision is formulated. He
is called in and given a ten-minute briefing on the
decision with a completely subjective analysis of why
it was the "right" decision. Then he is told in
effect: "Now, you get your gang to explain why this
decision was made and why it is the right one, so that
we'll get the credit we deserve." Obviously, in such
cases the practitioner is, and is expected to be,
simply a paid apologist.
3
The next consideration is whether Akerson was able
to facilitate the work of the President and the press.
Akerson's major effort in this area was the organization
and management of the presidential press conferences. The
details of the President's meetings with the press were
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carefully defined and agreed to, but neither the President
nor the press was able to work within the structure Akerson
designed. Akerson's arrangement had ignored the news
values and the time requirements of the press. In
addition, the President had committed himself to a rigid
schedule which he came to regret when the meetings proved
to be unproductive, and at times served only to increase
the hostility between the press and the President.
Akerson did facilitate the physical needs of the
press in the White House. When the White House was
remodeled during the early part of 1929, Akerson assured
facilities not only for the reporters but also for the
photographers. This same effort to accommodate the needs
of the press was not extended to the Rapidan camp where
press facilities were so inadequate.
Akerson' s opportunities to facilitate the work of
the President were limited. For example, it was French
Strother, not Akerson, who watched the trends of public
opinion and collected information about various publics the
President must serve.
In the delicate task of facilitating meaningful and
productive communication between the press and the
President, Akerson 's innovations were unsuccessful. The
President lived up to the letter of his press conference
agreements with the reporters and therefore considered
..
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criticism from the reporters unjustified. The press,
expecting the President to be more responsive to their
questions, sought whatever comfort they could by
complaining in print. Akerson's efforts to facilitate the
work of the press and the President ended in bitter
disappointment
•
The final measure of Akerson 's performance is his
ability to represent the press and the President to each
other. Akerson's success in this area was determined by
his influence with the press and the President.
First the President. Akerson *s influence with the
President was best demonstrated in Hoover's acceptance of
the press conference agreements. Unfortunately, the press
conferences showed early signs of failure. The failure of
the press conference agreement persisted throughout 1929
and increased in 1930. This annoying failure probably
diminished the influence Akerson had with Hoover and
prevented Akerson from gaining Hoover's approval on other
matters. Nothing in the White House papers suggests that
Akerson had any significant influence with the President
beyond the press conference agreement. The failure of the
press conferences, along with a strong-willed and
excessively sensitive President, made it unlikely that
Akerson was successfully able to plead the press*
case to the President.
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limited. Press opinion about Akerson in print Was
unflattering. Akerson was usually described as a pushy
back-slapper who made idle promises or a well-intentioned
glad-hander who was more decorative than useful. Akereon's
showy methods and style probably were not the basic reason
for his limited influence with the press. The reporters
realized that the press secretary did not enjoy full and
immediate access to the President. Akerson simply did not
know what was going on in the President's office,
consequently Akerson was not considered to be a reliable
information source about the President. Under these
conditions/ the press secretary could hardly represent the
President with any credibility.
Akerson* s successes and failures as the first
Presidential Press Secretary established some sound lessons
for his successors. In brief, these lessons are:
1. The system of written questions from the press is a
poor technique to stimulate productive communica-
tion at the President's press conferences.
2. A predetermined schedule of press conferences is an
unnecessary burden for the President; a rigid
schedule limits his flexibility in dealing with the
press.
3. Accuracy and knowledge must be the hallmark of the
press secretary if he is to maintain credibility
with the reporters.
4. The press secretary must have the full confidence
of his chief including a "walk-in " privilege to the
President's office.
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5. The President must be discouraged from indulging in
press favoritism or press recrimination.
6. Except in cases of dire national emergency/ the
press must be permitted to travel with the
President with full communications facilities
provided.
Herbert Hoover was a President who desperately
needed a strong, well-qualified, respected press secretary.
No matter how successful Hoover's press relations had been
prior to 1929, as President his sense of publicity,
including the value and timing of information and the
working relations with the press, was inadequate.
Hoover's need was great, but Akerson's ability to influence
the President was not commensurate with this need.
Akerson was a well-qualified newspaperman. He was
hard working and well intentioned. Akerson knew how a
news story developed; he understood news timing and values.
During the Commerce period, he demonstrated his abilities
as an organizer and activator. Akerson's great weakness
as press secretary was his inability to gain the
President's full confidence. Without this confidence, the
first press secretary's work can be judged as little more
than publicity mechanics.
Summarizing the accomplishments and failures of a
presidential administration remains a perplexing question.
Writing an evaluation of Hoover's administration in the
Saturday Evening Post of March 4, 1933, William Allen White
posed the question that is still open to speculation todays
iitv
«6W OH sqavan b' l&v 6
e won w-sr ow biBd
8WOf
•©1- fjf Cf.-^O »j rQ
sa«i/p pnix^lqseq e Mill
9*irfW nsIXA mis % * tioiaH *o .U&& yniiiava ygb^u^a^
:Y«bo* noi^slwceqe rta ai tar. jrf:t baaoq
125
"So history stands hesitant waiting for time to tell
whether Herbert Hoover • . . by pointing the way to social
recovery ... is the first of the new presidents ... or
whether ... he is the last of the old. M
President Hoover as a scientist, executive,
humanitarian, and businessman had a twentieth century
record. But as a communicator, a persuader, and a publi-
cist, his record was with his predecessors. Both Hoover
and Akerson were honest men who respected the truth but
during the first two years of Hoover's administration,
neither the President nor his press secretary was able to
activate the mass media system of communications to get
their message to the public.
. . .
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